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Abstract 
  In 1984, Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act, a landmark statute designed both to encourage 
innovation by pioneer drug companies and to increase competition by generic drug companies.  After the 
enactment of the Act, scholars, industry members, and federal agencies, including FDA and the FTC, 
noted that both innovator and generic companies engaged in strategic behavior attempting to “game” the 
regulatory regime to their respective economic advantage.  In 2003, FDA promulgated a final rule and 
Congress passed the Medicare Modernization Act, amending the Hatch-Waxman Act.  Both the 
regulatory and statutory changes attempted to address the loopholes in the statutory structure, provide 
clarity to the Hatch-Waxman framework, and achieve the balance between innovation and competition.      
This paper provides a comprehensive look at the 2003 statutory and regulatory changes, 
examining the issues that the 2003 amendments definitively resolved and analyzing the outstanding issues 
and the unintended consequences of these changes.  First, the paper analyzes the history, goals, and 
provisions of the original Hatch-Waxman Act and the issues that arose after its enactment.  Second, the 
paper discusses the passage of the 2003 FDA final rule and the 2003 Medicare Modernization Act, which 
were designed to settle some of these issues.  Next, this paper demonstrates that although the 2003 
amendments may have definitively resolved some preexisting disputes between drug companies, the 
amendments did not resolve all interpretive issues of the Hatch-Waxman Act and have even led to 
unintended consequences and further disputes between drug companies.  In particular, this paper 
discusses several areas of current controversy, including the effect of patent delisting and patent 
expiration on 180-day exclusivity, the interpretation of the patent delisting counterclaim provision, the 
application of the declaratory judgment action provision, the legality of patent settlement agreements, 
and the appropriateness of authorized generics.  Finally, this paper assesses the potential for future 
reform of the Hatch-Waxman Act, including several proposed avenues to address current disputes.  This 
paper concludes that maintaining Hatch-Waxman’s balance between promoting innovation and 
increasing generic competition has been and will likely remain a daunting task for legislators and 
regulators in the future.      
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I.  Introduction 
“FDA has tried to maintain a balance between protecting innovation in drug 
development and in expediting the approval of lower-cost generic drugs. . . . But 
let me say that there is no way, through rulemaking or through legislation, to 
avoid all opportunities for gaming. . . . [T]here are unforeseen circumstances and 
unintended consequences.”
1 
 
        -- Daniel E. Troy, Chief Counsel of FDA, 2003 
 
In September 1984, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984,
2 the landmark legislation commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.  
The Act was a compromise designed to balance the competing interests of research-based 
pharmaceutical companies (“innovators” or “pioneers”) and generic drug manufacturers 
(“generics”).  On the one hand, the Act was designed to encourage innovators to continue 
investing in the research and development of new drugs, and on the other hand, the Act was 
intended to increase generic drug competition in the pharmaceutical drug market, thereby 
lowering drug prices and consumer costs for drugs.   
The Hatch-Waxman Act “effectively created the modern generic pharmaceutical 
industry.”
3  In amending the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
4 (FD&C Act), the Hatch-
Waxman Act created a complex regulatory scheme governing the approval of generic drugs by 
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).  The Act provides for an Abbreviated New Drug 
                                                 
1 Legislative and Regulatory Responses to the FTC Study on Barriers to Entry in the 
Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 8, 14 
(2003) [hereinafter 2003 Hearing] (statement of Daniel E. Troy, Chief Counsel, FDA).   
2 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 360 (cc) (2000), 35 
U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2000)), as amended by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, 
and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003). 
3 Matthew Avery, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by Pharmaceutical Patent 
Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 171, 175 (2008).   
4 Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.).      
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Application (“ANDA”) process for generic drug manufacturers.
5  Instead of having to submit 
lengthy preclinical and clinical data demonstrating the drug’s safety and efficacy to FDA, like 
that required in an innovator’s New Drug Application (“NDA”), the only scientific data that a 
generic manufacturer must submit to FDA is data that the drug is “bioequivalent” to the pioneer 
drug.
6  Congress designed this ANDA process “to make available more low cost generic drugs”
7 
to American consumers.  This goal has arguably been achieved given the explosion in the growth 
of the generic drug industry since the passage of the Act.  Today, seven out of 10 prescriptions in 
the United States are for generic drugs.
8  As of 2007, of the 12,751 listed drugs in the Orange 
Book,
9 10,072 of the listed drugs have generic counterparts.
10  In 2007, brand pharmaceutical 
sales totaled $228 billion, while generic pharmaceutical sales totaled $58.5 billion.
11 
The other goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to encourage research-based 
companies to continue investing in the research and development of new drugs to cure or 
ameliorate medical problems – also a very important goal to American consumers.  The lengthy 
FDA premarket approval process was substantially decreasing the effective life of a drug 
                                                 
5See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j).  The Act also provides for an alternative route of generic drug approval 
through the submission of a “paper NDA,” now commonly called a section 505(b)(2) NDA.  See 
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2).  As most generic drugs are approved through the ANDA process, this 
paper will focus on the ANDA approval process.   
6 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv).   
7 H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (1984).  The House Report also stated, “The availability of 
generic versions of pioneer drugs approved after 1962 would save American consumers $920 
million over the next 12 years.”  Id. at 17.   
8 Susan Okie, Multinational Medicines–Ensuring Drug Quality in an Era of Global 
Manufacturing, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 737, 738 (2009). 
9 The Orange Book makes publicly available a list of all FDA-approved drugs.  See FDA, 
ORANGE BOOK: APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS, 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/default.cfm.   
10 See Generic Pharmaceutical Association (GPhA), Facts at a Glance, 
http://www.gphaonline.org/about-gpha/about-generics/facts.   
11 Id.    
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patent,
12 thus discouraging pioneer companies’ incentives to innovate.  In order to restore patent 
protection and encourage innovation, the Act provides that FDA may not approve an ANDA 
until all patent protection and market exclusivity periods have expired.
13  Additionally, the Act 
provides for patent term extension for drugs that were subject to regulatory review before the 
drug’s commercial marketing.
14  The concern over the “erosion in pharmaceutical innovation”
15 
is all the more present today, given the high costs of research and the long length of regulatory 
review.  “On average, it now takes 10 to 15 years to develop a new chemical entity (NCE) new 
drug.”
16  Additionally, only 5 of 5,000 chemicals that begin preclinical testing are approved by 
FDA, and “an approved NDA today costs well over $1 billion.”
17 
The Hatch-Waxman Act was a carefully constructed piece of legislation designed 
to achieve this fine balance between the interests of generic and pioneer drug companies.  
However, as one commentator predicted, given that the “Act is lengthy and complex . . . [n]o 
doubt many controversies will arise over FDA’s interpretations and implementation of the 
statute.”
18  This prediction turned out to be true, as much controversy and litigation arose in the 
years after the Act’s passage, with many commentators noting that both innovator and generic 
                                                 
12 Ellen J. Flannery & Peter Barton Hutt, Balancing Competition and Patent Protection in the 
Drug Industry: The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 40 FOOD 
DRUG COSM. L.J. 269, 301 (1985).   
13 See Peter Barton Hutt, Landmark Pharmaceutical Law Enacted, 1 HEALTH SCAN, No. 3 
(1984).   
14 See 35 U.S.C. § 156.   
15 Flannery & Hutt, supra note 12, at 301.   
16 PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL & LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD AND DRUG LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 577 (3d ed., Foundation Press 2007). 
17 Id.   
18 Flannery & Hutt, supra note 12, at 271.      
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drug companies were trying to “game” specific Hatch-Waxman provisions to their benefit,
19 at 
times with anticompetitive effects.
20  To provide clarity to the Hatch-Waxman process and to 
decrease the drug companies’ strategic behavior, both FDA and Congress made significant 
amendments to the Hatch-Waxman scheme in 2003.  This paper provides a comprehensive 
overview of the changes made in FDA’s 2003 regulation and Congress’s Medicare 
Modernization Act of 2003 (“MMA”).  This paper identifies the issues that the 2003 
amendments definitively resolved and identifies the unintended consequences and new 
controversies that have arisen since the 2003 changes.  These new problems illustrate that 
achieving the balance originally struck by the Act may be a continually daunting task for both 
Congress and FDA.   
This paper proceeds in five parts.  Part II provides a brief overview of the history 
and goals of the original Hatch-Waxman Act and then discusses the specific provisions of the 
Act.  Part III identifies controversies stemming from the Hatch-Waxman Act that arose prior to 
2003.  Part IV describes FDA’s promulgation of a final rule in 2003 and then discusses the 
legislative history and particular provisions of the 2003 MMA that amended the Hatch-Waxman 
Act.  This part also identifies the issues that the MMA and FDA final rule definitively resolved.  
Part V identifies both the new controversies that arose between drug companies as a result of the 
2003 MMA and the issues that the statutory amendments left outstanding.  This part discusses 
six of the unresolved issues regarding the Hatch-Waxman Act: (1) patent delisting and its effect 
                                                 
19 See generally Matthew Avery, supra note 3; Natalie M. Derzko, The Impact of Recent Reforms 
of the Hatch-Waxman Scheme on Orange Book Strategic Behavior and Pharmaceutical 
Innovation, 45 IDEA – J.L. & Tech. 164 (2004); Ankur N. Patel, Delayed Access to Generic 
Medicine: A Comment on the Hatch-Waxman Act and the “Approval Bottleneck,” 78 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1075, 1109 (2009).   
20 See generally Federal Trade Commission, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT 
EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY (July 2002) [hereinafter FTC Study], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf.    
  5 
 
 
on 180-day exclusivity; (2) patent expiration and its effect on 180-day exclusivity; (3) the patent 
delisting counterclaim provision; (4) generic companies’ declaratory judgment actions; (5) patent 
settlement agreements; and (6) authorized generics.  Part VI identifies possible solutions and 
reforms to the Hatch-Waxman Act that might ameliorate current disputes. 
II.  The Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 
In order to provide context, section A provides a concise background and history 
of drug regulation in the United States prior to the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act.  Section B 
presents an overview of the main provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act and their effect on the 
new and generic drug approval process.   
A.  Background and History of Drug Regulation 
In 1906, Congress passed the Pure Food and Drugs Act,
21 which did not mandate 
a federal premarket approval or notification system for new drugs.
22  However, in 1938, 
Congress replaced the 1906 Act with the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
23 (“FD&C 
Act”).  The FD&C Act established a premarket notification process, in which a pioneer drug 
manufacturer must submit to FDA safety data of its drug in a new drug application (“NDA”).  
Under the FD&C Act, FDA now performed a gatekeeping role, as the Act “authorized FDA to 
prevent marketing if the safety testing did not demonstrate the safety of the new drug.”
24  If the 
FDA did not reject the NDA within 60 days, the pioneer drug manufacturer was free to market 
the drug.
25  FDA designated some pioneer drugs as generally recognized as safe “old drugs” 
                                                 
21 34 Stat. 768 (1906).   
22 Flannery & Hutt, supra note 12, at 272.   
23 Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.).  
24 Flannery & Hutt, supra note 12, at 272.   
25 HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 16, at 577.      
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between 1938 and 1962, and allowed generic versions of these drugs to be marketed without 
having generic companies submit NDAs for the drugs.
26 
In 1962, Congress passed the Drug Amendments of 1962,
27 which immensely 
strengthened FDA’s regulatory authority.  The amendments fundamentally altered the drug 
review process from a simple premarket notification system to a more complex premarket 
approval system.
28  Under the amendments, a pioneer drug manufacturer must submit to FDA its 
own preclinical and clinical data demonstrating the drug’s safety and efficacy and then must 
receive FDA’s affirmative approval of the NDA before marketing its drug.
29  For FDA, with this 
new authority came great responsibility.  As Richard Merrill stated, “FDA is believed to have a 
different role, a responsibility to prevent harm before it occurs. . . . FDA is repeatedly reminded, 
and often reminds us, that it shares responsibility for any drug that causes harm.”
30   
After the passage of the 1962 Amendments, FDA adopted several different 
procedures for the approval of generic copies of pioneer drugs.  For pre-1962 pioneer drugs that 
FDA found to be safe and effective under its Drug Efficacy Study Implementation (“DESI”) 
program,
31 FDA created an abbreviated new drug application (“ANDA”) process whereby a 
generic company need only submit bioavailability and bioequivalence data demonstrating that its 
generic drug is as safe and effective as the pioneer drug.
32  For post-1962 pioneer drugs, generic 
drug manufacturers were required to submit a full NDA, including clinical data demonstrating 
                                                 
26 40 Fed. Reg. 26,142 (1975).   
27 Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962).   
28 See Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 
VA. L. REV. 1753 (1996).   
29 Id.   
30 Id.   
31 See Flannery & Hutt, supra note 12, at 273.   
32 21 C.F.R. § 314.2; see also Flannery & Hutt, supra note 12, at 274, 277.      
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the drug’s safety and efficacy.  FDA then established a “paper NDA” process for generic 
versions of both pre-1962 and post-1962 pioneer drugs in 1980.  “A paper NDA is a full NDA 
and must satisfy all of the same requirements as a pioneer NDA;”
33 however, a generic 
manufacturer could demonstrate the safety and effectiveness of a drug by pointing to published 
scientific literature, instead of conducting its own clinical trials.
34  In 1983, FDA then proposed a 
regulation to the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) that would create an 
ANDA process for post-1962 prescription drugs.
35  The generic drug manufacturers filed a 
lawsuit asking the court to compel FDA to create this ANDA process for post-1962 new drugs.
36  
Ultimately, the case was dismissed with the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act,
37 which 
superseded all of FDA’s prior regulations and proposals regarding the approval of generic 
drugs.
38  
The Hatch-Waxman Act “resolve[d] fifteen years of controversy about FDA’s 
policies and procedures governing the marketing approval for generic drugs.”
39  The title of the 
Act, The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, reveals Congress’s 
twin purposes in passing the Act.  The Act was designed as a compromise to accommodate the 
opposing interests of innovator companies and generic companies.  The Act was designed to 
“strike a balance between two conflicting policy objectives: to induce name-brand 
pharmaceutical firms to make the investments necessary to research and develop new drug 
                                                 
33 Flannery & Hutt, supra note 12, at 277.   
34 45 Fed. Reg. 82,052 (1980); 46 Fed. Reg. 27,396 (1981); see also Flannery & Hutt, supra note 
12, at 275.   
35 See Flannery & Hutt, supra note 12, at 276. 
36 Nat’l Ass’n of Pharm. Mfrs., Inc. v. Heckler, 83 Civ. 4817 (WCC) (S.D.N.Y.). 
37 See Flannery & Hutt, supra note 12, at 276.   
38 HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 16, at 759.   
39 See Flannery & Hutt, supra note 12, at 271.      
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products, while simultaneously enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies of those 
drugs to market.”
40   
The legislative history of the Act, although “relatively sparse,”
41 provides some 
insight into Congress’s dual motivations in passing the Act.  On June 21, 1984, the House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce issued a Report that analyzed the ANDA process and 
patent term restoration features of the Act.
42  First, with regard to the ANDA procedure, 
Congress aimed to increase generic drug entry into the pharmaceutical market in order to drive 
down drug prices and consumer drug costs.  The House Report noted that it was not beneficial or 
efficient for generic drug manufacturers to submit full NDAs, which must include their own 
human clinical studies, for post-1962 drugs.  The Report declared that “FDA considers such 
retesting to be unnecessary and wasteful because the drug has already been determined to be safe 
and effective.  Moreover, such retesting is unethical because it requires that some sick patients 
take placebos and be denied treatment known to be effective.”
43  Additionally, the Report recited 
the fact that 150 post-1962 pioneer drugs were on the market, off-patent, and with no generic 
equivalent,
 44 thus illustrating the need for a streamlined process to increase the number of 
generic drugs on the market.  Furthermore, the House Report stated, “The availability of generic 
versions of pioneer drugs approved after 1962 would save American consumers $920 million 
                                                 
40 aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 230 (4th Cir. 2002).   
41 Flannery & Hutt, supra note 12, at 271.  For instance, the Senate did not issue a report.  Id.    
42 H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1 (1984).   
43 Id. at 16.  
44 Id. at 17.      
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over the next 12 years.”
45  Not only would the Act save American consumers a significant 
amount of money, but state and national governments would benefit greatly in cost savings.
46   
Second, the House Report provided insight into Congress’s goal of increasing the 
incentives for research-based companies to innovate and develop new drugs.  The House Report 
asserted that “[t]he incentive is the restoration of some of the time lost on patent life while the 
product is awaiting pre-market approval.  Under current law, a patent continues to run while the 
maker of the product is testing and awaiting approval to market it.”
47  The Report noted the 
testimony from pharmaceutical company representatives that said that although the patent term 
was 17 years,
48 the effective patent term was much less than that, given the research trials and 
regulatory review process.
49  Thus, in order to stem the reduction in the effective patent term for 
drug products, Congress adopted the patent term restoration feature of the Act.    
B.  Provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
The Hatch-Waxman Act revised section 505 of the FD&C Act, which regulates 
the approval of new drugs, and added section 505(j) to the FD&C Act, which established the 
                                                 
45 Id. 
46 Id.   
47 Id. at 15.   
48 In 1994, Congress extended the length of the patent term to 20 years from the date of patent 
filing.  See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 108 Stat. 4809 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 156) 
(1994).   
49 H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 17.  In 1980, the House Subcommittee on Science, Research, 
and Technology issued a Report stating that it takes seven to thirteen years for a pioneer drug 
manufacturer to undergo the research and clinical testing and NDA approval process mandated 
by FDA.  See THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION’S PROCESS FOR APPROVING NEW DRUGS, 
REPORT BY THE SUBCOMM. ON SCIENCE, RESEARCH, AND TECHNOLOGY, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 
(1980).  Thus, the effective patent life is “less than half the seventeen years” provided under 
patent law.  Flannery & Hutt, supra note 12, at 30.      
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ANDA approval process for generic drugs.
50  The Hatch-Waxman Act also amended the Patent 
Act in several respects.   
The Hatch-Waxman Act amended section 505(b) of the FD&C Act, which 
determines the information that a pioneer manufacturer must submit to FDA in its NDA for the 
approval of its new drug.
51  As mentioned in the previous section, the NDA is a lengthy 
document, which must include animal and human studies showing the drug’s safety and 
effectiveness.
  Submitting an NDA takes much time and expense: “[d]evelopment of the average 
NCE ANDA drug takes some 15 years from preclinical research through NDA approval and 
costs in excess of $1.5 billion.”
52  Under revised section 505(b), an innovator company must also 
provide to FDA “the patent number and the expiration date of any patent which claims the drug 
for which the applicant submitted the application or which claims a method of using such drug 
and with respect to which a claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted if a person 
not licensed by the owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug.”
53   
This revision of section 505(b) was made pursuant to Hatch-Waxman’s addition 
of new section 505(j), specifically section 505(j)(7).  Section 505(j)(7) mandated that FDA 
publish a publicly available list of all FDA-approved drugs,
54 with each drug listing containing 
the patent listings claiming the drug or its method of use.  The list of approved drugs must 
contain those approved by full NDAs, paper NDAs, and ANDAs.
55  One purpose of this public 
                                                 
50 21 U.S.C § 355(j).   
51 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b).   
52 HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 16, at 764 n.6. 
53 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1).   
54 FDA-approved NDA drugs are known as “listed drugs” under the statute.  See 21 U.S.C. § 
355(j)(2)(A)(i).   
55 See Flannery & Hutt, supra note 12, at 293.      
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listing of approved drugs was for generic companies to “identify[] drugs eligible for abbreviated 
NDAs.”
56  Pursuant to this section, FDA created the APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH 
THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS, commonly known as the Orange Book.
57  Along 
with a list of approved drugs, the Orange Book also contains “an evaluation of the therapeutic 
equivalence of the [generic] drug products.”
58  A therapeutic equivalence rating of “A” in the 
Orange Book means that FDA considers the drug to be therapeutically equivalent, while a 
therapeutic equivalence rating of “B” means that FDA finds bioequivalence problems with the 
drug.
59  In accordance with the statute, FDA must update the list every thirty days with newly 
approved drugs and with revised patent information.
60 
In the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress created two options for generic companies 
to gain approval of their generic versions of pioneer drugs.  The Act retained FDA’s distinction 
between an ANDA and a paper NDA.  Thus, a generic company can file an ANDA with FDA 
under section 505(j),
61 or it can file a paper NDA under section 505(b)(2).
62  As most generic 
                                                 
56 See HUTT, MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra note 16, at 757.   
57 The publication was called the “Orange Book” because of the color of its cover.  See 68 Fed. 
Reg. 36,676 (June 18, 2003).  The Orange Book is now electronic and can be found on FDA’s 
website.  See FDA, ORANGE BOOK: APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC 
EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/default.cfm.   
58 See HUTT, MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra note 16, at 757.   
59 See id.   
60 See Flannery & Hutt, supra note 12, at 293.   
61 An ANDA can be submitted to FDA under two circumstances.  First, where the generic drug is 
the “same” as the pioneer drug “in all material respects,” the generic drug manufacturer can 
submit an ANDA directly to FDA.  HUTT, MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra note 16, at 760.  
Second, where the generic drug is “different’ from the innovator drug in a material respect, the 
generic drug manufacturer must submit a “suitability petition” to FDA, “demonstrating that the 
difference between the drugs is not sufficient to preclude an abbreviated NDA, and that 
additional studies to show safety and effectiveness are not needed.”  Id.  If FDA grants the 
suitability petition, the generic manufacturer can submit the ANDA, but if FDA does not grant 
the petition, the generic manufacturer must submit a full NDA or a section 505(b)(2) NDA.  Id.      
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manufacturers have utilized the ANDA process and the ANDA process is central to this paper’s 
analyses in the sections below, only the ANDA process will be described in detail.
63  Congress 
created the ANDA process to streamline the generic drug approval process for generic drug 
manufacturers.
64  The Act states that “[a]ny person may file with the Secretary an abbreviated 
application for the approval of a new drug.”
65  Under this process, instead of having to supply 
FDA with clinical data demonstrating the safety and effectiveness of the drug, the only scientific 
study that generic manufacturers need to submit to FDA is one demonstrating that the generic 
drug is “bioequivalent” to the listed drug.
66  Additionally, in an ANDA, the generic manufacturer 
must include information to show that: (1) the active ingredient of the generic drug is the same as 
that of the pioneer drug;
67 (2) the generic drug has the same route of administration, dosage form, 
and strength as the pioneer drug;
68 and (3) the generic drug’s labeling must be same as the 
labeling of the pioneer drug.
 69 
                                                                                                                                                            
62 Recall from the preceding section, supra notes 33 – 34 and accompanying text, that paper 
NDAs, now called section 505(b)(2) NDAs, are like full NDAs, except generic manufacturers 
are allowed to use published scientific literature to demonstrate the safety and efficacy of their 
generic drug.  “[T]he section 505(b)(2) NDA is mid-way between a full NDA and an abbreviated 
NDA.”  HUTT, MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra note 16, at 771.   
63 The Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 applies “the same rules to both” ANDAs and section 
505(b)(2) NDAs.  Hutt, supra note 13. 
64 See supra notes 42 – 46 and accompanying text.   
65 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(1).   
66 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv).  Under 21 U.S.C. §355(j)(8)(B)(i), a drug is considered to be 
“bioequivalent” to a listed drug if “the rate and extent of absorption of the drug do not show a 
significant difference from the rate and extent of absorption of the listed drug when administered 
at the same molar dose of the therapeutic ingredient under similar experimental conditions in 
either a single dose or multiple doses.”   
67 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii).   
68 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iii).   
69 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i).  Certain exceptions to this requirement can apply.      
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Furthermore, as part of the ANDA application, generic manufacturers are required 
to file one of the following four certifications for each Orange Book patent listing covering the 
listed drug: (I) the patent information has not been filed with FDA; (II) the patent has expired; 
(III) the date when the patent expires; or (IV) the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the 
manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the application is submitted.
70  When the 
generic manufacturer seeks to market a generic equivalent of an innovator’s drug before the 
expiration of an Orange Book patent listing covering that drug, the generic company submits a 
Paragraph IV certification.
71  An ANDA applicant filing a Paragraph IV certification must notify 
both the patent owner and the NDA holder of the certification and “include a detailed statement 
of the factual and legal basis of the opinion of the applicant that the patent is invalid or will not 
be infringed.”
72  If an NDA holder lists additional patents in the Orange Book after the ANDA 
was filed with FDA, the ANDA applicant must make additional certifications within thirty days 
of the listing of the new patent.
73 
The Hatch-Waxman Act revised the Patent Act to provide that the filing of an 
ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification is treated as a technical act of patent infringement.
74  
The Hatch-Waxman Act added this artificial infringement provision to protect NDA patent 
holders, so that the infringement dispute could be resolved before the generic drug hits the 
                                                 
70 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).   
71 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).   
72 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iv)(II).   
73 See Derzko, supra note 19, at 174. 
74 See 21 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2).  Also, the Hatch-Waxman Act amended the Patent Act at 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(e)(1), so that it is not an act of infringement for a generic drug manufacturer to use a 
patented drug (prior to the patent’s expiration) solely for testing purposes in order to satisfy 
FDA’s submission requirements.  This provision overturned the Federal Circuit’s decision in 
Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed Cir. 1984).      
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market.
75  Also, as stated by one commentator, “From society’s perspective, early resolution of 
such patent disputes is generally considered beneficial since it helps clear the way for generic 
drug entry if a patent is in fact invalid, or if a patent is found to be valid but not infringed.”
76  
After receiving notice, if the NDA holder brings a patent infringement action against the ANDA 
applicant within forty-five days, FDA is barred from approving the ANDA for thirty months 
from the date of the receipt of the notice.
77  However, if the patent expires or if a court rules that 
the patent is invalid or not infringed, FDA can then immediately approve the ANDA.
78  
Additionally, the statute provides that “[t]he court may increase or decrease the 30-month period 
specified in the statute if it determines that either party has failed to expedite the proceeding.”
79  
If the NDA holder does not bring suit against the ANDA applicant within forty-five days, FDA 
may approve the ANDA immediately.
80  
Additionally, if the listed drug contains a method of use patent “which does not 
claim a use for which the [ANDA] applicant is seeking approval,” the ANDA applicant must 
submit “a statement that the method of use patent does not claim such a use.”
81  This statement is 
commonly known as a “section viii” statement, and does not constitute an act of infringement 
like a Paragraph IV certification. 
The Hatch-Waxman Act also provides that the first ANDA applicant to file with 
FDA a Paragraph IV certification to a patent covering a pioneer drug will be granted 180 days of 
                                                 
75 See Flannery & Hutt, supra note 12, at 285.   
76 Derzko, supra note 19, at 239.   
77 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).   
78 Id.   
79 See Flannery & Hutt, supra note 12, at 285.   
80 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).  If the ANDA contains just Paragraph I or Paragraph II 
certifications, FDA may approve the ANDA immediately.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(i).   
81 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii).      
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generic marketing exclusivity.
82  FDA will not approve subsequent ANDAs for the same pioneer 
drug until the expiration of the 180 days.
83  Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the first Paragraph IV 
ANDA filer’s 180-day exclusivity is triggered by either the commercial marketing of the generic 
drug or a court decision finding the patent invalid or not infringed, whichever is earlier.
84  This 
180-day exclusivity is very profitable for generics,
85 and as such, the provision is meant to 
“encourage generic applicants to challenge weak or questionable patents.”
86   
The Hatch-Waxman Act provided a mechanism to accelerate generic drug entry 
into the pharmaceutical market, but the Act also added increased patent protection and periods of 
market exclusivity for NDA holders.  The Act provides that FDA may not approve an ANDA 
until all patent protection and market exclusivity periods have expired.
87  In terms of market 
exclusivity, for a new chemical entity (“NCE”) NDA, a generic manufacturer cannot submit an 
ANDA to FDA until five years after FDA approval of the NCE NDA (or four years if the generic 
company is challenging a pioneer drug’s patent as invalid or not infringed).
88  For a non-NCE 
NDA, a generic manufacturer cannot submit an ANDA to FDA until three years after FDA 
                                                 
82 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).   
83 See id.   
84 Id.   
85 “An important feature of the regime is a large incentive to litigate the validity and scope of an 
innovator’s patents, a “bounty” worth hundreds of millions of dollars for a major drug.”  C. Scott 
Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design 
Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1560 (2006).   
86 Mary W. Bourke & M. Edward Danberg, Current Trends in Hatch-Waxman Patent Litigation: 
A System Still in Flux, 878 PRACT. L. INST. – PAT. 939, 960 (2006); see also 2003 Hearing, supra 
note 1, at 5 (statement of Timothy J. Muris, Chairman of the FTC) (“[The 180-day exclusivity] 
provision provides an incentive for companies to challenge patent validity and to design around 
patents.”).   
87 See Hutt, supra note 13.   
88 See id.      
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approval of the non-NCE NDA.
89  These periods of market exclusivity apply even if the patents 
of the pioneer NDA have expired.
90  Additionally, as discussed above, if an ANDA filer makes a 
Paragraph IV certification to one of the NDA holder’s patents, the NDA holder can institute an 
infringement action within forty-five days and receive a thirty-month stay.
 91  Thus, if an NCE 
NDA holder commences an infringement action, FDA may not approve an ANDA until seven 
and a half years after FDA approval of the NCE NDA.
92  
  Additionally, in amending the Patent Act, the Hatch-Waxman created the 
opportunity for patent term restoration for a drug patent, in order to remedy the decline in the 
patent’s life due to the lengthy testing and FDA premarket approval process.
93  The patent term 
extension provision applies to product, method of use, and process patents, subject to five 
requirements.
94  The statute provides that “[t]he term of a patent eligible for extension under 
subsection (a) shall be extended by the time equal to the regulatory review period for the 
approved product which period occurs after the date the patent is issued.”
95  This extension of the 
patent term by the regulatory review period is subject to four limitations.  First, the statute 
defines the regulatory review period as half of the investigational phase, plus the entire length of 
                                                 
89 Id. 
90 See id.   
91 See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.     
92 See Flannery & Hutt, supra note 12, at 292.  However, if a court in the infringement action 
rules that all of the challenged patents are invalid or not infringed before the end of the thirty-
month stay, FDA can approve the ANDA.  Id.   
93 35 U.S.C. § 156.   
94 35 U.S.C. § 156(a).  These five requirements include that: (1) the patent has not expired; (2) 
the patent has not been previously extended; (3) the patent holder has submitted an appropriate 
patent extension application; (4) the product was subject to a regulatory review period prior to its 
commercial marketing; and (5) the commercial marketing was the first such marketing permitted 
by statute (with certain exceptions).  Id.  
95 35 U.S.C. § 156(c).      
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time that FDA is assessing whether to approve a filed NDA.
96  Second, the patent extension is 
limited to five years for each patent.  “Third, the total effective patent life of the product, after 
the patent term is extended, cannot exceed fourteen years.”
97  Fourth, the statute provides that the 
regulatory review period will be reduced for any period of time the NDA applicant did not act 
with “due diligence.”
98  Finally, within 60 days of FDA approval of the NDA, the NDA patent 
holder must submit an application to the Patent Office in order to be eligible to receive patent 
term restoration.
99 
III.  Successes and Controversies Stemming from the Hatch-Waxman Act 
 Section A of this Part briefly discusses the changed landscape of the 
pharmaceutical drug market after the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act, including increased 
drug competition and decreased drug costs.  Section B details several of the controversies that 
arose after the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act, particularly pertaining to innovator and 
generic drug companies’ “gaming” of several of the Act’s provisions, including the thirty-month 
stay provision and the 180-day exclusivity provision.   
A.  The Achievement of Increased Generic Drug Competition 
In crafting a streamlined ANDA approval process for generic drugs, the Hatch-
Waxman Act spurred the development and growth of the generic drug industry.  In contrast to 
the extraordinary length of time and cost it takes to develop and receive FDA approval of an 
NCE NDA pioneer drug,
100 the development and FDA approval of an ANDA drug takes only 
                                                 
96 35 U.S.C. § 156; see also Flannery & Hutt, supra note 12, at 304.   
97 Flannery & Hutt, supra note 12, at 304; see also 35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(3).     
98 35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(1).   
99 35 U.S.C. § 156(d)(1).   
100 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.      
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three to five years and costs the generic drug manufacturer only up to $500,000.
101  This shorter, 
less-expensive ANDA mechanism for receiving drug approval has created a boom in the generic 
drug industry.  “Since 1984, the generic industry has grown to more than $16 billion in annual 
sales, representing more than 53% of all prescriptions filled in 2004.”
102  With the entry of more 
generic drugs onto the market, increased competition has led to the reduction of drug prices.  An 
FDA study demonstrates that the entry of generic drugs onto the market drives down prices 
dramatically.
103  When the first generic drug enters the market, there is only a five percent 
decrease in the innovator drug price.  However, the entry of the second generic competitor leads 
to a fifty percent decrease in the pioneer drug price, and the sixth generic competitor leads to a 
seventy-five percent decrease in the pioneer drug price.
104   
This downward pressure on drug costs translates into significant savings for 
consumers, state governments, and the federal government.  A 1998 Congressional Budget 
Office (“CBO”) Study calculated that in 1994, for drug sales at pharmacies, consumers saved $8 
billion to $10 billion on drug costs by substituting generic versions for the innovator drugs.
105  In 
2003, FDA’s Chief Counsel, Daniel Troy, highlighted this achievement of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act when he stated, “[S]ince its enactment in 1984, Hatch-Waxman has become an extremely 
valuable tool in making medications more affordable to American citizens. . . . To date, FDA has 
approved more than 10,000 generic drug products, providing high-quality, lower-cost 
                                                 
101 See HUTT, MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra note 16, at 764 n.6. 
102 Bourke & Danberg, supra note 86, at 950. 
103 FDA, Generic Competition and Drug Prices (Apr. 4, 2006). 
104 Id.   
105 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS 
AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY ix (JULY 1998), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=655&sequence=0.    
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prescription drugs to millions of consumers.”
106  Thus, the Act has been a success in increasing 
generic competition in the pharmaceutical market and driving down drug prices.   
B.  Controversies Arising Out of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
However, given the complexity, length, and sometimes ambiguous language of 
the Hatch-Waxman Act, several controversies arose after its passage.  Many commentators 
asserted that both innovator and generic drug manufacturers engaged in “gaming” the Act, 
exploiting several of the Act’s provisions to their favor,
107 sometimes with anticompetitive 
consequences.
108  One scholar stated, “[C]ertain aspects of the Hatch-Waxman Act came under 
intense scrutiny because observers found that both innovators and generics were engaging in 
strategic behavior within the Hatch-Waxman scheme to better their own economic positions.  As 
a result, the entry of certain generic drugs into the marketplace may have been delayed.”
109  
Senator Hatch, one of the original authors of the Hatch-Waxman Act, declared that 
“anticompetitive behaviors [were] made possible in part by the sometimes complex and 
admittedly confusing text of [the] law.”
110  Furthermore, he stated that “some research-based and 
                                                 
106 2003 Hearing, supra note 1, at 6 (statement of Daniel E. Troy, Chief Counsel, FDA).   
107 See Avery, supra note 3, at 179 (“There has long been a concern that patent holders have used 
loopholes in the Hatch-Waxman Act to deter or delay generic competition.”); Derzko, supra note 
19, at 175 (“The rules encouraged innovative companies and generic companies to behave 
strategically to their own benefit but at the expense of consumer interests.”).    
108 See 2003 Hearing, supra note 1, at 33 (prepared statement of the FTC) (“[T]he Commission 
has observed through its investigations, law enforcement actions, and industry-wide study that 
some brand-name and generic drug manufacturers may have “gamed” these two provisions, 
attempting to restrict competition beyond what the Amendments intended.”); see also id. at 6 
(statement of Daniel E. Troy, Chief Counsel, FDA) (“Of course, there are two provisions that 
have been associated with some anticompetitive behavior – the submission of brand name drug 
patents for listing by FDA, and the role of these patents in generating 30-month stays in the 
approval of generic drugs while patent infringement issues are litigated.”).       
109 Derzko, supra note 19, at 167. 
110 2003 Hearing, supra note 1, at 1 (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch).      
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generic drug firms were attempting to game the system to avoid competition in the 
marketplace.”
111   
In July 2002, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) released a study called 
GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY (“FTC Study”) that 
examined generic drug manufacturers’ attempts to enter the pharmaceutical market prior to the 
expiration of the NDA holder’s drug patents.
112  Thus, the FTC analyzed only those generic 
companies’ ANDAs containing Paragraph IV certifications.  The FTC analyzed 104 brand-name 
drugs between 1992 and 2000 to determine whether any anticompetitive behavior by innovator 
and generic drug companies was systematically occurring to keep generic drugs off the 
market.
113  This Part analyzes the main controversies that arose after the passage of the Hatch-
Waxman Act, which were detailed extensively in the FTC Study, regarding: (1) patent listing and 
thirty-month stays; and (2) 180-day exclusivity and patent settlement agreements.   
1.  Patent Listing and the Thirty-Month Stay Provision 
Since 1984, FDA has maintained that it performs a completely ministerial role 
with respect to Orange Book patent listings.  Thus, the agency does not evaluate the sufficiency 
or correctness of the patent information submitted by the NDA holder; it relies instead on the 
NDA holder to submit the required information correctly.  In its 1994 regulation, FDA stated that 
the “agency believes that its scarce resources would be better utilized in reviewing applications 
                                                 
111 Id. at 2.    
112 See FTC Study, supra note 20; see also 2003 Hearing, supra note 1, at 40 (prepared statement 
of the FTC).   
113 See FTC Study, supra note 20; see also 2003 Hearing, supra note 1, at 4 (statement of 
Timothy J. Muris, Chairman of the FTC).        
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rather than reviewing patent claims. . . . FDA does not have the resources or the expertise to 
review patent information for its accuracy and relevance to an NDA.”
114   
The Hatch-Waxman Act and FDA regulations implementing the Act did not 
provide clear guidance on what patents NDA holders should and should not list in the Orange 
Book.
115  For instance, “the regulations did not provide any guidance as to whether patents 
directed to metabolites, polymorphs . . . or drug delivery modalities could be appropriately 
listed.”
116  This lack of guidance on what patents should be listed in the Orange Book became of 
extreme importance because of the nexus between patent listings and the thirty-month stay 
provision.   Patents listed in the Orange Book after the filing of an ANDA, or “late-listed” 
patents, could trigger an additional thirty-month stay of FDA approval of the ANDA.  If an NDA 
holder files a patent with FDA after an ANDA applicant had already filed its ANDA, the ANDA 
applicant must make a certification to the newly listed patent.
117  If the ANDA filer makes a 
Paragraph IV certification to the late-listed patent, the NDA holder can file an infringement suit 
against the ANDA applicant within forty-five days to receive an additional thirty-month stay.      
FDA’s unclear rules regarding patent listing, coupled with the availability of 
another thirty-month stay after a Paragraph IV certification is made to a late-listed patent, 
“created a tremendous incentive for innovative companies to broadly interpret the law governing 
                                                 
114 Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations; Patent and Exclusivity Provisions, 59 Fed. 
Reg. 50,338, 50,343 (Oct. 3, 1994).   
115 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1); 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b) (2002).  Under the statutory language, “The 
applicant shall file with the application the patent number and the expiration date of any patent 
which claims the drug for which the applicant submitted the application or which claims a 
method of using such drug and with respect to which a claim of patent infringement could 
reasonably be asserted if a person not licensed by the owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or 
sale of the drug.”  21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1).   
116 Derzko, supra note 19, at 190. 
117 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).      
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what types of patents could be listed.”
118  Thus, pioneer companies frequently listed 
“improvement” patents in the Orange Book, such as those “for disectable tablets and special 
coatings, new formulations, crystalline forms of the same drug, and variations on drug delivery 
systems.”
119  With each late-listed patent, the innovator company could receive another thirty-
month stay of FDA approval of the Paragraph IV ANDA filer’s application.  This practice of 
gaining multiple thirty-month stays through the late-listing of patents in the Orange Book has 
been termed “evergreening.”
120  For instance, one prominent example of this “evergreening” 
practice relates to SmithKline Beecham Corporation’s brand-name drug Paxil.  Paxil, used to 
treat obsessive-compulsive disorder, was a $2.1 billion blockbuster drug.  After instituting its 
first patent infringement action against a Paragraph IV ANDA filer, SmithKline filed nine late-
listed patents and obtained five additional 30-month stays.
121 
This “evergreening” practice led to antitrust litigation.  One scholar noted that 
“[i]t is now common that ancillary to patent litigation initiated under the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
antitrust claims will be filed against the pharmaceutical patentee, either during the infringement 
action itself or in subsequent class action suits.”
122  Allegations of misrepresentation or fraud in 
connection with the patents listed in the Orange Book have given rise to antitrust charges against 
                                                 
118 Derzko, supra note 19, at 176.   
119 Terry G. Mahn, Patenting Drug Products: Anticipating Hatch-Waxman Issues During the 
Claims Drafting Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 245, 250 (1999).   
120 Derzko, supra note 19, at 186.  One commentator claimed that “the Orange Book can be a 
strategic weapon . . . giving the patentee/NDA holder almost automatic injunctive relief for even 
marginal infringement claims.”  Mahn, supra note 119, at 250.   
121 See 2003 Hearing, supra note 1, at 18 (statement of Sen. Charles E. Schumer); see also 
Derzko, supra note 19, at 176.   
122 Esther H. Steinhauer, Is Noerr-Pennington Immunity Still a Viable Defense Against Antitrust 
Claims Arising from Hatch-Waxman Litigation, 61 FOOD DRUG L.J. 679, 679 (2006).    
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the NDA holder.
123  For instance, in In re Buspirone Patent & Antitrust Litigation,
124 Bristol-
Myers listed a new patent in the Orange Book the day before the expiration of a listed patent and 
then initiated infringement litigation against generic manufacturers who made Paragraph IV 
certifications to this patent.  Allegations were made that Bristol-Myers “knew that the newly 
asserted patent did not cover any of the approved uses for buspirone . . . [and] that Bristol-Myers 
misrepresented this issue to the FDA when requesting Orange Book listing of the patent.”
125  
Bristol-Myers moved to dismiss the Orange Book patent listing antitrust claims on the basis of 
Noerr-Pennington immunity, which means that “those who petition government for redress are 
generally immune from antitrust liability.”
126  However, the court dismissed Bristol-Myers’s 
claim for immunity because an Orange Book patent listing “does not require the FDA to perform 
an independent review of the validity of the statements made in support of the patent’s scope.”
127  
Because Orange Book patent listing is more similar to filing a tax than petitioning the 
government, the court held that Orange Book listing can lead to antitrust liability. 
The FTC Study investigated the occurrence of this “evergreening” practice in 
order to examine whether there was an anticompetitive effect on generic competition from the 
late-listing of patents in the Orange Book.  The Study noted that for eight of the brand-name drug 
products, innovator companies filed late-listed patents and received an additional thirty-month 
stay.
128  The additional thirty-month stay caused a delay – ranging from four to forty months – in 
                                                 
123 Id. at 680. 
124 185 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).   
125 Steinhauer, supra note 122, at 685.   
126 Id. at 681. 
127 Id. at 686. 
128 See FTC Study, supra note 20, at iii.       
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FDA approval of the ANDA.
129  Furthermore, out of these eight cases, four courts have ruled on 
the validity of the late-listed patent and all have found that the patent was either invalid or not 
infringed.
130  Due to these findings, the FTC recommended that “only one 30-month stay be 
permitted per drug product per ANDA to resolve infringement disputes over patents listed in the 
Orange Book prior to the filing date of the generic applicant’s ANDA.”
131  The study also 
recommended that FDA revise and clarify its patent listing requirements.
132  
Given the unclear statutory and regulatory provisions regarding Orange Book 
patent listing and the high stakes of each listing due to the possibility of additional thirty-month 
stays, much controversy existed between generic and innovator companies prior to 2003 
regarding the appropriateness of many Orange Book patent listings.  Generic companies often 
believed that the innovator companies were filing “sham” patents in order to delay generic drug 
approval.  Between 1984 and 2003, generic companies attempted to prevent multiple thirty-
month stays by challenging the pioneer companies’ Orange Book patent listings and requesting 
delisting of the patents as a remedy.  However, in Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson,
133 
the Federal Circuit held that the Hatch-Waxman Act did not provide a private cause of action 
against an NDA holder for the delisting of an Orange Book patent.  Thus, under the Hatch-
Waxman Act, generic companies were left without a mechanism to correct or delist patents they 
believed to be inaccurate or inappropriately listed. 
2.  180-Day Exclusivity and Patent Settlement Agreements  
                                                 
129 Id. at iii.    
130 Id. at iii-iv.   
131 See 2003 Hearing, supra note 1, at 40 (prepared statement of the FTC); see also FTC Study, 
supra note 20, at ii.   
132 See FTC Study, supra note 20, at v.   
133 268 F.3d 1323, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2001).      
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Another major controversy that arose after the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
concerned the 180-day market exclusivity provision.  This provision grants to the first generic 
applicant who files an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification a period of 180 days of market 
exclusivity during which FDA may not approve another ANDA for the same drug.
134  The 180-
day market exclusivity is triggered by the date of the commercial marketing of the generic drug 
or the date of a court ruling that the patent is invalid or not infringed, whichever is earlier.
135  
Several issues arose surrounding the interpretation and application of this provision.  First, in 
1994, FDA issued a final regulation stating that it would only grant 180-day exclusivity to the 
first Paragraph IV ANDA applicant who was sued in a patent infringement action by the pioneer 
drug company and successfully defended against the claim.
136  According to FDA, the 
“successful defense” requirement served to eliminate ANDA applicants’ incentive to file 
“frivolous claims of patent invalidity or noninfringement.”
137  However, in Mova 
Pharmaceuticals, Corp. v. Shalala,
138 the D.C. Circuit rejected FDA’s “successful defense” 
requirement as contrary to the plain text of the Hatch-Waxman Act.
139  In light of the Mova 
decision, FDA eliminated the “successful defense” requirement from its rule
140 and instead 
adopted an approach consistent with the plain language of the statute – “a first-to-file basis,”
 141 
                                                 
134 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).   
135 Id.   
136 See 59 Fed. Reg. 50338 (Oct. 3, 1994). 
137 Id. at 50353.   
138 955 F. Supp. 128, 130 (D.D.C. 1997), aff’d 140 F.3d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1998).   
139 Mova, 140 F.3d at 1069. 
140 See FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: 180-DAY GENERIC DRUG EXCLUSIVITY UNDER THE 
HATCH-WAXMAN AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT 4 (June 
1998), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatory 
Information/Guidances/ucm079342.pdf.   
141 See Derzko, supra note 19, at 195.      
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in which the first generic applicant to submit an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification to a 
patent would receive 180-day exclusivity. 
Second, another interpretive issue arose surrounding whether a decision of a 
district court or appeals court was necessary to trigger a generic applicant’s 180-day exclusivity.  
In its 1999 rulemaking, FDA interpreted “a decision of a court”
142 to mean “the court that enters 
final judgment from which no appeal can be or has been taken.”
143  However, in Mylan 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Shalala,
144 the D.C. District Court rejected FDA’s interpretation and 
reasoned that the appropriate court decision to trigger 180-day exclusivity was that of a district 
court.
145  In light of the Mylan decision, FDA changed its rule to reflect that a district court 
decision will trigger a generic applicant’s 180-day exclusivity.
146   
Besides the two interpretive problems discussed above, an area of main concern 
was that innovator and generic companies were entering into patent settlement agreements, and 
in doing so, they were able to use the 180-day exclusivity provision to keep subsequent generic 
applicants off the market.  The FTC notes that “both parties have economic incentives to collude 
to delay generic entry.  By blocking entry, the brand name may preserve monopoly profits.  A 
portion of these profits, in turn, can be used to fund payments to the generic manufacturer,” who 
agrees to forgo selling its generic drug on the market.
147  In the scenario of a patent settlement 
agreement, there is no court decision finding that the patent is invalid or not infringed, and there 
is no commercial marketing of the generic drug.  Hence, there is no trigger of the first generic 
                                                 
142 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).   
143 21 C.F.R. 314.107(e)(1) (1999).   
144 81 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000).   
145 Id.   
146 See FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 140, at 5.  
147 2003 Hearing, supra note 1, at 34 (prepared statement of the FTC).       
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applicant’s 180-day exclusivity.  Thus, FDA cannot approve subsequent generic applicants’ 
ANDAs because the 180-day period has not run.  As a result, generic competition for the drug 
may be delayed well into the future.  Some commentators have termed this delayed entry of 
generic competitors into the market due to the delayed triggering of 180-day exclusivity “the 
approval bottleneck.”
148 
The FTC Study examined the substance and effects of the patent settlement 
agreements entered into by drug companies between 1992 and 2000.
149  The study showed that 
generic applicants that submitted ANDAs containing Paragraph IV certifications “prevailed in 73 
percent of the cases in which a court ha[d] resolved the patent dispute.”
150  However, the FTC 
Study found that in twenty cases the parties entered into a patent settlement agreement.
151  In 
nine of these settlements, the innovator company paid the generic applicant.
152  These types of 
settlements, with payments flowing from the innovator company to the generic company, are 
sometimes called “reverse-payment settlements” or “pay-for-delay settlements.”
153   In seven of 
these settlements, the innovator company licensed the generic applicant to use the NDA holder’s 
patents prior to patent expiration.
154  Finally, in two of the settlements, the generic company was 
                                                 
148 See Patel, supra note 19, at 1095 (“However, exhaustion of the exclusivity may be delayed, 
into the distant future, as a result of settlement.  This ‘approval bottleneck’ effectively prevents 
Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA filers from obtaining FDA approval, delaying generic entrants 
into the marketplace.”); see also Avery, supra note 3, at 181. 
149 See 2003 Hearing, supra note 1, at 14, 19 (prepared statement of the FTC).    
150 See FTC Study, supra note 20, at vi.   
151 Id. at vii.  The Study also identified six generic-generic settlement agreements, with “some of 
those [raising] anticompetitive problems.”  2003 Hearing, supra note 1, at 15 (statement of 
Timothy J. Muris, Chairman of the FTC). 
152 See 2003 Hearing, supra note 1, at 45 (prepared statement of the FTC).    
153 See Ark. Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 2010); 
Avery, supra note 3, at 181 – 82.   
154 See 2003 Hearing, supra note 1, at 45 (prepared statement of the FTC).       
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allowed to market the brand-name drug under the pioneer company’s NDA, but not under the 
generic’s ANDA.
155 
In eight of the nine reverse-payment settlements, the generic manufacturer agreed 
not to manufacture or sell its generic product until the expiration of the NDA holder’s patents.
156  
“The range of brand payments was $1.75 million to $132.5 million, and the time between the 
date of the agreement and patent expiration ranged between 4 months and 10 years.”
157  For 
instance, in one such settlement, the innovator company paid the generic company $66.4 million, 
with the NDA drug’s patents not expiring until over nine years later.
158  Until the expiration of 
the drug patents, then, the generic company’s 180-day market exclusivity was not triggered, and 
FDA could not approve subsequent generic companies’ ANDAs.
159  Ultimately, the FTC Study 
“found 14 settlement agreements that, when executed, had the potential to park the first generic 
applicant’s 180-day exclusivity for some time, and thus prevent subsequent generic entry.”
160  
The FTC concluded that, although the 180-day exclusivity provision did not create this approval 
bottleneck by itself, the 180-day provision coupled with the patent settlement agreements have 
led to delayed generic competition.
161  As a result of the study’s findings, the FTC recommended 
that Congress enact a statute that requires innovator and generic drug companies to provide 
                                                 
155 See FTC Study, supra note 20, at 25.   
156 Id. at 31. 
157 Id.   
158 Id. at 32 Table 3-3.   
159 However, if a subsequent generic Paragraph IV ANDA filer were able to obtain a court 
decision of patent invalidity or non-infringement with respect to the NDA holder’s drug patents, 
then this decision would trigger the first ANDA filer’s 180 day exclusivity.  Id. at 31.   
160 2003 Hearing, supra note 1, at 5 (statement of Timothy J. Muris, Chairman of the FTC); see 
FTC Study, supra note 20, at vii.   
161 See 2003 Hearing, supra note 1, at 46 (prepared statement of the FTC).       
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copies of some patent settlement agreements to the FTC and the Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”).
162 
As demonstrated by this Part, evidence surfaced, particularly from the FTC Study, 
that both generic and innovator companies engaged in “gaming” certain provisions of the Hatch-
Waxman Act to their advantage, sometimes with the effect of delaying generic drug entry.  As 
such, many commentators began calling for reform of the Act, which will be discussed in Part IV 
of this paper.   
IV.  The 2003 Amendments: FDA’s Final Rule and the Medicare Modernization Act  
Part III described the main controversies that arose after the passage of the Hatch-
Waxman Act, particularly with regard to the patent listing provision, thirty-month stay provision, 
and 180-day exclusivity provision.  This Part discusses the changes that were made to the Hatch-
Waxman scheme to correct the loopholes that led innovator and generic companies to “game” 
certain provisions of the Act.  Section A describes FDA’s 2003 rule on patent listing 
requirements.  Section B briefly describes the legislative background leading up to the passage of 
the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003
163 (“Medicare 
Modernization Act” or “MMA”).  Section C analyzes the specific provisions of the Medicare 
Modernization Act, which amend certain provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act.  Finally, section 
D assesses the issues that were definitively resolved by the 2003 final rule and the MMA.   
                                                 
162 See FTC Study, supra note 20, at vi, viii; see also 2003 Hearing, supra note 1, at 46 (prepared 
statement of the FTC).   
163 Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 
and 42 U.S.C.).      
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A.  2003 FDA Regulation 
In response to the controversies over patent listings and thirty-month stays, and 
the FTC’s recommendations regarding these issues,
164 FDA issued a final rule on June 18, 
2003.
165  The rule contained two main changes to the Hatch-Waxman regulatory scheme.  First, 
the rule “clarifie[d] patent submission and listing requirements, which will reduce confusion and 
help curb attempts to take advantage of this process.”
166  Second, the rule stated that there will 
only be one thirty-month stay available for each ANDA and section 505(b)(2) application.  FDA 
reasoned that “[e]liminating multiple 30-month stays will speed up the approval and market 
entry of generic drugs.”
167  FDA asserted that the rule would maintain the original balance struck 
by the Hatch-Waxman Act.
168  Although the aspects of the final rule relating to thirty-month 
stays were superseded by the passage of the MMA, the aspects of the final rule pertaining to 
patent listing submission requirements remain in effect.  As such, only those parts of the rule 
regarding patent listings will be discussed in this section.    
                                                 
164 See supra notes 131 – 132 and accompanying text.  The FTC Study recommended that FDA 
clarify its patent listing rules and allow for only one thirty-month stay for each ANDA or section 
505(b)(2) application.  Id.   
165 68 Fed. Reg. 36676 (June 18, 2003) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b)(1)).  The rule was first 
proposed on October 24, 2002.  See 67 Fed. Reg. 65448 (Oct. 24, 2002).   
166 Id. at 36676.  The Chief Counsel of FDA stated that the submission requirements and signed 
declaration forms “will significantly reduce opportunities to list inappropriate patents just to 
prevent access to low-cost generic alternatives.”  2003 Hearing, supra note 1, at 7 (statement of 
Daniel E. Troy, Chief Counsel, FDA).   
167 Id.  The Chief Counsel of FDA declared after its promulgation, “We expect th[e] rule to save 
patients over $35 billion in drug costs over 10 years.”  2003 Hearing, supra note 1, at 7 
(statement of Daniel E. Troy, Chief Counsel, FDA).   
168 68 Fed. Reg. 36676 (“The final rule maintains a balance between the innovator companies’ 
intellectual property rights and the desire to get generic drugs on the market in a timely 
fashion.”).      
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The rule stated that NDA applicants must submit drug substance patents, drug 
product patents, and method of use patents for listing in the Orange Book.
169  The rule clarified 
that only method of use patents claiming approved uses are to be listed.  The rule stated that 
patents claiming processing, packaging, intermediates, or metabolites are not to be listed in the 
Orange Book.
170  Additionally, “[p]atents claiming a different polymorphic form of the active 
ingredient described in the NDA must be submitted if the NDA holder has test data 
demonstrating that a drug product containing the polymorph will perform the same as the drug 
product described in the NDA.”
171 
Also, the rule revises the patent information that a pioneer company must submit 
to FDA
172 and requires a pioneer company to submit this patent information on signed 
declaration forms both with its NDA (FDA Form 3542a) and after FDA approval of its NDA 
(FDA Form 3542).
173  As one commentator noted, the FDA’s new rule requires “NDA applicants 
to make careful and more detailed representations in their patent declarations to produce greater 
compliance with the patent listing requirements.”
174  For method of use patents claiming 
approved methods of use, the forms require NDA applicants to make a claim-by-claim listing.
175  
The applicant must provide a description of the approved use for the use code listing, which is 
                                                 
169 Id. at 36678.   
170 Id. at 36676.   
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 36677.   
173 Id. at 36686, 36707 – 36712.    
174 Barry J. Marenberg, FDA Issues Final Rule on Patent Listing Requirements and 30-Month 
Stays of Approval Following Submission of Abbreviated New Drug Applications, 23 
BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 48, 49 (2004).   
175 68 Fed. Reg. at 36682.      
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limited to 240 characters.
176  FDA explained that this claim-by-claim listing for method-of-use 
patents was required in order to determine whether an ANDA applicant could “carve out” the 
method of use in a section viii statement, or whether it had to certify to the listed patent.
177  The 
declaration forms make “willful and knowingly false statements” on the forms a criminal 
offense.
178  The new patent listing requirements apply only to prospective patents listed after the 
rule came into force on August 18, 2003.
179   
In this rulemaking, FDA maintained its purely ministerial role with regard to 
patent listings in the Orange Book.  FDA stated, “A fundamental assumption of the Hatch-
Waxman Amendments is that the courts are the appropriate mechanism for the resolution of 
disputes about the scope and validity of patents.  The courts have the experience, expertise, and 
authority to address complex and important issues of patent law.”
180  In rejecting the suggestion 
to create an administrative review process for patent listings, FDA noted that “it would be 
inappropriate and impractical for us to create regulatory mechanisms for reviewing patent 
listings or permitting third parties to submit patents for listing.  We lack both the resources and 
the expertise to resolve such matters.”
181 
                                                 
176 Id. at 36686.   
177 Id. at 36682 (“In determining whether an ANDA applicant can “carve out” the method of use, 
rather than certify to the listed patent, we will rely on the description of the approved use 
provided by the NDA holder or patent owner in the patent declaration and listed in the Orange 
Book.”).   
178 Id. at 36686.   
179 Id. at 36676, 36696. 
180 Id. at 36676, 36683.   
181 Id. at 36683.  After the promulgation of the final rule, FDA’s Chief Counsel stated in a Senate 
hearing, “I want to make clear that we do not undertake an independent review of the patents 
submitted by the NDA sponsor.  We have tried in our new rule to make it clear which patents 
must and must not be listed, and to have a beefed-up declaration.”  2003 Hearing, supra note 1, 
at 6 (statement of Daniel E. Troy, Chief Counsel, FDA).      
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The Hatch-Waxman Act and FDA regulations make patent listing mandatory.
182  
Under the 2003 rule, NDA applicants must submit to FDA patent information related to certain 
patents (including drug product, drug substance, and method of use) and must not submit patent 
information related to other patents (such as metabolites and intermediates).  However, as 
illustrated by the discussion above, FDA does not rigorously review the patent listing process.
183  
Instead, FDA relies on the pioneer drug company to submit correct and accurate patent 
information, pursuant to the statute and regulations, for listing in the Orange Book.
184  Courts 
have upheld FDA’s ministerial role with regard to patent listing.
185  Recently, in Teva 
Pharmaceuticals, USA, Inc. v. Leavitt,
186 the D.C. Circuit stated that “[w]hen it comes to the 
veracity of the patent information supplied by NDA holders, FDA operates in a purely 
ministerial role, relying on the NDA holders to provide the Agency with accurate patent 
information.”
187  The court stated that this interpretation of FDA’s role is consistent with the text 
of the Hatch-Waxman Act, which only requires FDA to publish patent information provided by 
the NDA holders.
188  The circuit court also noted that FDA’s policy choice is sound and should 
be upheld.
189   
                                                 
182 See Derzko, supra note 19, at 18 (“[T]he statute mandates patent listing in accordance with 
the parameters set forth therein, rather than being permissive.”); see also FDA, Decision Letter 
to ANDA Applicants (Mar. 26, 2010), at 7 n.14 (“Patent listing is not optional.”).   
183 See FDA, Decision Letter to ANDA Applicants (Mar. 26, 2010), at 7 n.14 (“It is, of course, 
true that FDA does not have the patent expertise to enforce the statutory requirement that 
appropriate patents be listed or delisted.”).   
184 Bourke & Danberg, supra note 86, at 954. 
185 See Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1348 – 49 (Fed. Cir. 2003); aaiPharm Inc. v. 
Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 242 – 43 (4th Cir. 2002).   
186 548 F.3d 103 (D.C. Cir. 2008).   
187 Id. at 106.   
188 Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)).   
189 Id. at 106 – 107.     
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B.  Legislative Background 
The 107
th Congress initiated attempts at reform of the Hatch-Waxman Act, with 
the Senate introducing bill S. 812 in 2001.
190  The White House, the FTC, and FDA opposed this 
bill, believing that it would encourage too much litigation.
191  Although S. 812 passed the Senate 
in July 2002, a similar bill died in the House.
192  The 108
th Congress continued reform efforts – 
with the introduction of Senate bill S. 1225 in June 2003 – this time in light of the findings and 
recommendations of the FTC Study released in July 2002.   
The FTC Study, discussed in detail above in Part III,
193 was “a key document for 
policymakers” in crafting the 2003 statutory amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act.
194  The 
study examined whether two statutory provisions – the 180-day exclusivity and thirty-month stay 
provisions – were used to delay generic competition.
195  As mentioned previously, the FTC 
Study prepared findings demonstrating the anticompetitive effects of these provisions and made 
two major recommendations: (1) a limit of one thirty-month stay per ANDA to resolve the 
disputes of those patents listed in the Orange Book prior to the filing of the ANDA; and (2) a 
requirement that certain patent settlement agreements be filed with the FTC and the DOJ.
196   
                                                 
190 S. 812, 107th Cong. (2002); see also LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, BILL SUMMARY & STATUS, 
107
TH CONGRESS (2001-2002), S. 812, MAJOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:SN00812:@@@R.   
191 See 2003 Hearing, supra note 1, at 12 (statement of Senator Orrin G. Hatch) (“[T]he White 
House cited its fear that S. 812 might encourage excessive litigation.”); id. at 13 (statement of 
Daniel E. Troy, Chief Counsel, FDA) (“We certainly agree with you about S. 812 and we 
thought it would unduly induce too much litigation . . . .”).     
192 See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, BILL SUMMARY & STATUS, 107
TH CONGRESS (2001-2002), H.R. 
1862, MAJOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d107:HR01862:.   
193 See supra notes 112-113, 128-132, 149-162 and accompanying text.   
194 See 2003 Hearing, supra note 1, at 3 (statement of Senator Orrin G. Hatch).   
195 See FTC Study, supra note 20, at i-ii.   
196 See id. at i-viii.      
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The FTC Study also made several minor recommendations.  Regarding the 180-
day exclusivity provision, the FTC made three proposals, which included clarifying that: (1) the 
“commercial marketing” trigger includes the generic company’s marketing of the pioneer drug 
product; (2) the “court decision” trigger includes a trial court’s decision on patent invalidity or 
non-infringement; and (3) the “court decision” trigger includes a court’s dismissal of a 
declaratory judgment action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
197  These minor 
recommendations regarding the 180-day exclusivity provision were meant both to clarify the 
triggers of the exclusivity period and to prevent the 180-day exclusivity provision from 
contributing to an “approval bottleneck.”  Additionally, due to FDA’s ministerial role with 
regard to patent listings, the FTC Study suggested that a generic Paragraph IV ANDA applicant 
be allowed to assert a counterclaim raising patent listing issues in a patent infringement lawsuit 
instituted by the NDA holder.
198 
The Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on June 17, 2003,
199 at which 
Senator Hatch, the Chairman of the FTC, the Chief Counsel of FDA, and others expressed their 
views on S. 1225, which contained revisions to the Hatch-Waxman Act.
200  A theme that 
permeated throughout the hearing was the commentators’ expressed desire to maintain the 
balance between innovation and competition struck by the original Hatch-Waxman Act.  For 
instance, the Chief Counsel of FDA stated that the “main goal . . . in this area is to promote 
innovation, while also promoting rapid access to low-cost, safe and effective generic drugs.”
201  
The hearing participants also acknowledged that the loopholes in the Hatch-Waxman structure 
                                                 
197 See id. at viii-xi.   
198 See 2003 Hearing, supra note 1, at 44 (prepared statement of the FTC).   
199 Id.     
200 Id.   
201 Id. at 6 (statement of Daniel E. Troy, Chief Counsel, FDA).      
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must be fixed in order to promote competition.  Senator Hatch remarked that Congress should 
strive “to end several mechanisms by which some research-based and generic drug firms [have 
attempted] to game the system to avoid competition in the marketplace.”
202  To this end, most 
participants agreed that adopting the FTC Study’s two main recommendations would help 
achieve this goal.  Additionally, acknowledging the large sums of money at stake and the good-
lawyering of Hatch-Waxman issues,
203 several participants stated their concern that adding new 
provisions to the Hatch-Waxman Act would create new loopholes.  For instance, the Chief 
Counsel of FDA declared that “I know of no more of the law in which the law of unintended 
consequences operates with more force than this one . . . [E]ither way you tilt it, you can’t write 
it so clearly that there are no opportunities for gaming.”
204 
The hearing also contained discussion of several specific provisions in S. 1225.  
First, for instance, S. 1225 contained a declaratory judgment provision, which provides that an 
NDA holder’s failure to bring a patent infringement action against a Paragraph IV ANDA filer 
within forty-five days of receiving notice establishes a case or controversy sufficient for the 
generic applicant to bring a declaratory judgment action in federal court.
205  During the hearing, 
a representative for DOJ stated that the department had not yet reached a conclusion regarding 
the constitutionality of this provision.  However, Professor John Yoo stated at the hearing that he 
believed the declaratory judgment provision to be constitutional.
206  Second, another provision of 
                                                 
202 Id. at 2 (statement of Senator Orrin G. Hatch).   
203 Id. at 9 (statement of Daniel E. Troy, Chief Counsel, FDA) (“There is no end to the originality 
of the arguments that are made in this area.  The dollars are very large, the issues are extremely 
well-lawyered”).   
204 Id. at 8, 15.    
205 See S. 1225, 108th Cong. (2003).   
206 2003 Hearing, supra note 1, at 23 – 24 (statement of John Yoo, Professor of Law, Univ. of 
California at Berkeley).      
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great concern was the 180-day exclusivity provision.  Senator Hatch remarked that the first-to-
file system gave a “not fully justified advantage . . . to first filers” and “may already be 
encouraging earlier lawsuits of dubious merit.”
207  Other commentators at the hearing discussed 
the importance of legislative efforts to prevent first generic applicants from parking their 180-
day exclusivity.
208   
Soon after this hearing, the Senate decided to introduce the reforms to the Hatch-
Waxman Act in S. 1, and the House was debating a similar bill, H.R. 1.
209  During the Senate’s 
debate over S. 1, the Senators commentated on the abuses of the Hatch-Waxman Act since its 
enactment, particularly those causing the delay of generic competition.
210  The Senate’s debate 
again highlighted the need to balance innovation and competition, just as in the original Hatch-
Waxman Act.  For instance, Senator McCain declared: 
I believe that this amendment will improve the current system while preserving 
the intent of Hatch-Waxman.  This legislation is not an attempt to jeopardize the 
patent rights of innovative companies, nor does it seek to provide an unfair 
                                                 
207 Id. at 12 (statement of Senator Orrin G. Hatch).  Senator Hatch continued by remarking, 
“Now, from a policy perspective, why should a mere first filer be treated better than a party who 
actually wins a lawsuit?”  Id. at 13.   
208 Id. at 13 (statement of Daniel E. Troy, Chief Counsel, FDA) (“That said, we are working, we 
think very productively with the staff on S. 1225 to embody more of a, shall we say, use it or lost 
it approach so that someone can’t park their exclusivity.”).   
209 H.R. 1 was introduced in the House on June 25, 2003.  See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, BILL 
SUMMARY & STATUS, 108TH CONGRESS (2003 – 2004), H.R. 1, MAJOR CONGRESSIONAL 
ACTIONS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:HR00001:@@@R.  The House and 
Senate bills contained the Hatch-Waxman revisions, but were widely publicized due to their 
reform of the Medicare program, particularly regarding the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit.  
See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, BILL SUMMARY & STATUS, 108TH CONGRESS (2003 – 2004), H.R. 1, 
CRS SUMMARY, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d108:HR00001:@@@D&summ2=m&. 
210 See 149 Cong. Rec. S8193 (statement of Senator Gregg) (“What we saw regrettably, under 
Hatch-Waxman, was there were games being played.”); see also 149 Cong. Rec. S8190 
(statement of Senator McCain) (“The amendment closes loopholes in the current food and drug 
laws that allow brand pharmaceutical companies to protect themselves from generic competition 
by unfairly extending drug patent life, maximizing company profits on the backs of American 
consumers.”).     
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advantage to generic manufacturers.  Rather, the intent of this amendment is to 
strike a balance between these two interests so that we can close the loopholes 
that allow some companies to engage in anti-competitive actions by unfairly 
prolonging patents or eliminating fair competition.
211 
 
Additionally, Senator Frist remarked, “The Hatch-Waxman law has almost 20 years of balance, 
and now is the time to go back and readjust and make sure that balance is well situated going 
forward.”
212   
The House and the Senate passed their respective bills on June 27, 2003.
213  Both 
of these bills contained similar provisions, including: (1) a limit of one thirty-month stay per 
ANDA; (2) a declaratory judgment action for a Paragraph IV ANDA filer if the pioneer 
company does not file an infringement suit within forty-five days of receiving notice; (3) a patent 
delisting counterclaim for a Paragraph IV ANDA filer in a patent infringement case; (4) various 
forfeiture events for a first Paragraph IV ANDA filer’s 180-day exclusivity; and (5) a 
requirement to notify the FTC and the DOJ regarding certain patent settlement agreements.
214  
However, the bills contained several differences, particularly regarding the text of the declaratory 
judgment and counterclaim provisions.  After the Senate passed an amended version of H.R. 1, a 
conference committee was convened.
215  
                                                 
211 149 Cong. Rec. S8190 (emphasis added).   
212 149 Cong. Rec. S8197.   
213 See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, BILL SUMMARY & STATUS, 108TH CONGRESS (2003 – 2004), H.R. 
1, MAJOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d108:HR00001:@@@R; LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, BILL SUMMARY & STATUS, 
108TH CONGRESS (2003 – 2004), S. 1, MAJOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS,  
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:SN00001:@@@R.   
214 WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, HATCH-WAXMAN RELATED PROVISIONS OF THE 
MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG BILLS (H.R. 1 AND S. 1): A SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON, 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (2003), available at 
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/rl32003.pdf.   
215 149 Cong. Rec. H6681.     
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On August 1, 2003, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing to analyze the 
differences between H.R. 1 and S. 1.
216  At this hearing, two main points of contention arose 
about the reform provisions.  First, participants in the hearing brought up several concerns 
regarding the 180-day exclusivity provision and its proposed forfeiture provisions.  Senator 
Hatch, an original draftsman of the Hatch-Waxman Act, noted that both bills contain a “first-to-
file regime” to determine which Paragraph IV ANDA applicant would receive 180-day 
exclusivity.
217  Senator Hatch evinced his disapproval of this regime and instead advocated for a 
successful challenger regime:  
I am a proponent of what I call a successful challenger system.  It seems to me 
that the first successful challenger, be it the first generic to be sued, the first to 
win in court, or the first to be granted a covenant not to be sued by the pioneer 
firm, is more deserving than a mere first filer. . . . [I]t appears to me that the 180-
day marketing exclusivity provisions in the pending legislation contain perverse 
incentives that may result in unfortunate, if unintended, consequences.
218 
 
Additionally, the FTC Chairman noted his dissatisfaction with the drafting of the failure to 
market forfeiture provision, which he believed still left open the possibility of a generic applicant 
“parking” its exclusivity, thus delaying generic drug entry.  The Chairman noted that in order to 
avoid this outcome, the FTC recommended that the failure to market provision: (1) refer to a 
district court decision and not an appeals court decision; and (2) state that a court decision 
“dismissing a declaratory judgment action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction would trigger 
                                                 
216 Examining the Senate and House Versions of the “Greater Access to Affordable 
Pharmaceuticals Act,” Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (Aug. 1, 
2003) [hereinafter Examining the Senate and House Versions Hearing].   
217 Id. at 2 (statement of Senator Orrin G. Hatch).   
218 Id. at 2 – 3.       
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the first applicant’s 180-day period.”
219  The Chief Counsel of FDA added, “We think that some 
of the 180-day provisions could create unintended difficulties.”
220 
Second, another point of contention between the commentators at the hearing 
concerned the constitutionality of the declaratory judgment provision contained in S. 1.  This 
provision in S. 1 stated that a patent owner’s failure to bring a patent infringement lawsuit 
against the Paragraph IV ANDA applicant in forty-five days after receiving notice establishes an 
actual controversy under Article III, sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on federal 
district courts to hear a generic applicant’s declaratory judgment action.
221  The representative of 
the DOJ, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Sheldon Bradshaw, testified that DOJ viewed this 
declaratory judgment provision as unconstitutional.
222  Bradshaw explained that this provision 
“is inconsistent with Article III of the Constitution.  This provision . . . attempts to vest the lower 
Federal courts with jurisdiction over disputes, that because of Article III’s case or controversy 
requirement, the Constitution does not empower these courts to hear.”
223  However, Senator 
Schumer responded to these concerns by referring to the letters of constitutional scholars John 
Yoo and Henry Dinger that stated that the provision was constitutional.
224  H.R. 1, instead, 
contained a declaratory judgment provision that only created the statutory cause of action under 
the Declaratory Judgment Act.  Under this provision, a district court must still find that an actual 
case or controversy exists under Article III in order to have subject matter jurisdiction over the 
                                                 
219 Id. at 5 (statement of Timothy J. Muris, Chairman of the FTC).   
220 Id. at 23 (statement of Daniel E. Troy, Chief Counsel, FDA).   
221 Id. at 11 (statement of Sheldon Bradshaw, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, OLC, DOJ).   
222 Id.  
223 Id.   
224 Id. at 15 – 16 (statement of Senator Charles E. Schumer).      
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action.
225  Attorney Bradshaw did not find any constitutional infirmity with H.R. 1’s declaratory 
judgment provision.
226 
Finally, a familiar theme that again pervaded this hearing was the need to achieve 
the balance between innovation and competition.  Senator Hatch summed up this sentiment when 
he stated:  
I want to make sure that when we get [these bills] done, they are constitutionally 
sound and that they really work and that they don’t upset the balance between the 
need to have new, innovative drugs created at a cost of $800 million to $1 billion, 
where you have got to get that money back or you can’t keep investing in it – the 
need to do that and the need to get them into generic form as quickly as possible.  
That is the balance of Hatch-Waxman that we worked hard to create and really 
has worked remarkably well, in spite of even some of these conflicts and 
problems that we have had.
227 
 
The House Conference Report No. 108-391 was filed on November 21, 2003.
228  
The Report was passed by the House on November 22, 2003, and was subsequently passed by 
the Senate on November 25, 2003.
229  President George W. Bush signed the Medicare 
Modernization Act into law on December 8, 2003.
230   
C.  Medicare Modernization Act of 2003  
Title XI of the Medicare Modernization Act, entitled “Access to Affordable 
Pharmaceuticals,” significantly amended the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984.  Subtitle A included 
reforms of the thirty-month stay and 180-day exclusivity provisions, and Subtitle B contained the 
                                                 
225 See id. at 19 (statement of Sheldon Bradshaw, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, OLC, 
DOJ).   
226 Id.  
227 Id. at 27 (statement of Senator Orrin G. Hatch). 
228 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, BILL SUMMARY & STATUS, 108TH CONGRESS (2003 – 2004), H.R. 1, 
MAJOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d108:HR00001:@@@R. 
229 Id. 
230 See Statement of Pres. George W. Bush upon Signing H.R. 1, WHITE HOUSE PRESS. REL. 
(Dec. 8 2003), 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2201.      
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FTC and DOJ review of certain patent settlement agreements for antitrust violations.  This 
section provides an overview of eight of the important changes the MMA made to the existing 
Hatch-Waxman structure.   
First, the MMA effectively limited an innovator company to one thirty-month stay 
per ANDA.
231  With the passage of the MMA, an innovator company can only receive a thirty-
month stay for patents listed in the Orange Book before a generic applicant submits its ANDA.
232  
Therefore, if a generic applicant submits an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification, and the 
NDA holder files suit within forty-five days of receiving notice, a thirty-month stay of FDA 
approval of the ANDA will be triggered.  If the NDA holder then lists new patents in the Orange 
Book after the filing of the ANDA, the generic applicant must file certifications to the new 
patents, but no additional thirty-month stays will be triggered even if the new certifications are 
Paragraph IV certifications.
233  Additionally, the MMA revised the Hatch-Waxman Act such that 
a district court decision of patent invalidity or non-infringement will end a thirty-month stay of 
FDA approval.
234  If the district court determines that the patent has been infringed but an 
appeals court reverses the district court and finds that the patent is valid or not infringed, the 
                                                 
231 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).  This provision superseded the part of the 2003 FDA final 
rule relating to thirty-month stays.   
232 Id. 
233 However, under the MMA, there are still some scenarios in which multiple thirty-month stays 
may be triggered for the same ANDA.  For instance, assume a generic applicant submits an 
ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification to one patent and Paragraph III certifications to the 
other NDA holder’s patents.  The NDA holder files a patent infringement lawsuit against the 
generic applicant within forty-five days, which triggers a thirty-month stay of ANDA approval.  
The ANDA applicant then decides to amend its ANDA by changing one of the Paragraph III 
certifications to a Paragraph IV certification.  Because the patent was listed in the Orange Book 
before the ANDA was first submitted, the NDA holder can file an infringement lawsuit against 
the ANDA applicant within forty-five days of receiving notice and trigger another thirty-month 
stay. 
234 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I).      
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thirty-month stay is terminated upon the decision of the appeals court.
235  Finally, in conjunction 
with the new thirty month-stay provisions, the MMA added a provision that an ANDA applicant 
may not amend or supplement its ANDA to include a different listed drug, although the applicant 
may amend or supplement its ANDA to include a different drug strength.
236  This provision was 
intended to prevent ANDA applicants from receiving only one thirty-month stay of approval for 
an application that sought approval of two different drug products.
237 
Second, the MMA added a new requirement that a generic applicant that submits 
an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification must notify the NDA holder and patent holder of this 
certification within twenty days after the FDA files the ANDA.
238 
Third, the MMA revised the trigger of the 180-day exclusivity provision.  Under 
the original Hatch-Waxman Act, the period of 180-day exclusivity was triggered by the earlier of 
the date of first commercial marketing of the generic drug or of a court decision finding the 
patent invalid or not infringed.  The MMA deleted the court decision trigger and stated that the 
180-day exclusivity period is triggered by the “first commercial marketing of the drug (including 
the commercial marketing of the listed drug) by any first applicant.”
239  One commentator 
explained that “[t]his change allows generic companies the opportunity to ‘gear up’ for launch 
after the litigation has ended.”
240  Also, it is important to note that the MMA commercial 
marketing trigger includes the generic company’s commercial marketing of the pioneer drug.  
This provision was included so that if, in a patent settlement agreement, the NDA holder granted 
                                                 
235 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(II).  
236 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(4).  
237 Bourke & Danberg, supra note 86, at 971.  
238 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(ii).   
239 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).   
240 Bourke & Danberg, supra note 86, at 972.      
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the generic company a license to market the pioneer drug, the generic company’s 180-day 
exclusivity would be triggered. 
Fourth, the MMA provided that 180-day exclusivity applies per drug product and 
not per drug patent.
241  Therefore, the first generic applicant that submits a substantially complete 
ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification to any patent of the listed drug will be eligible for 180-
day exclusivity.  If a subsequent generic applicant files an ANDA application for the same drug 
product, but makes a Paragraph IV certification to a different patent than the previous ANDA, 
then the subsequent generic applicant is not entitled to 180-day exclusivity.  Under this first-to-
file regime, if two first Paragraph IV ANDA filers submit their ANDAs to FDA on the same day, 
then these two generic applicants will receive shared 180-day exclusivity.
242  Additionally, if the 
first-to-file generic applicant (or all first applicants if there is shared exclusivity) forfeits its 180-
day exclusivity, then no subsequent generic applicants that filed ANDAs with Paragraph IV 
certifications will be eligible to receive 180-day exclusivity.
243 
Fifth, the MMA added forfeiture provisions by which the first Paragraph IV 
ANDA applicant will forfeit its right to the 180-day exclusivity period if a “forfeiture event” 
occurs.
244  The “failure to market” forfeiture provision is a complex provision that requires two 
dates to occur before forfeiture is triggered.  The provision states that the first Paragraph IV 
                                                 
241 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(bb) (“[T]he term ‘first applicant’ means an applicant that, 
on the first day on which a substantially complete application containing a certification described 
in paragraph 2(A)(vii)(IV) is submitted for approval of a drug, submits a substantially complete 
application that contains and lawfully maintains a certification described in paragraph 
2(A)(vii)(IV) for the drug.”).   
242 See id.; see also Bourke & Danberg, supra note 86, at 972.  This shared exclusivity begins on 
the day either company starts commercial marketing.  See HUTT, MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra 
note 16, at 769.   
243 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(iii) (“If all first applicants forfeit the 180-day exclusivity period 
under clause (ii) . . . (II) no applicant shall be eligible for a 180-day exclusivity period.”).   
244 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i).        
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ANDA applicant will forfeit 180-day exclusivity if it fails to market the drug by the later of: (1) 
75 days after the ANDA is approved, or 30 months after the ANDA is filed, whichever is earlier; 
or (2) 75 days after one of the following has occurred: (i) a court enters a decision, from which 
no appeal has been or can be taken, that finds the pioneer’s patent is either invalid or not 
infringed; (ii) a settlement agreement is approved that includes a finding that the pioneer’s patent 
is either invalid or not infringed; or (iii) the patent holder withdraws the patent information from 
the Orange Book.
245  In order to calculate the “later of” date, a date under each prong of the 
failure to market provision must have occurred.  For instance, a first generic applicant will forfeit 
exclusivity if the applicant fails to market the drug within 75 days after FDA approves the 
ANDA and within 75 days after a court finds the patent invalid or not infringed.  Note also that 
under the second prong of the failure to market provision, any generic applicant, and not just the 
first generic applicant, can cause the occurrence of a triggering event, such as a court decision of 
patent invalidity or non-infringement.
246 
The MMA also created five additional forfeiture events: (1) the first ANDA 
applicant withdraws its application;
247 (2) the first ANDA applicant withdraws or amends all of 
its Paragraph IV certifications qualifying it for 180-day exclusivity;
248 (3) the first ANDA 
applicant fails to obtain tentative approval of its ANDA within 30 months of filing;
249 (4) the 
first ANDA applicant enters into an agreement with the patent holder or another generic 
company that the FTC or a court finds to violate federal antitrust laws;
250 or (5) all patents to 
                                                 
245 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I).   
246 See id.; see also Derzko, supra note 19, at 244.   
247 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(II). 
248 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(III). 
249 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(IV).   
250 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(V).      
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which the first applicant made Paragraph IV certifications qualifying it for 180-day exclusivity 
have expired.
251  The MMA forfeiture provisions are intended to prevent first Paragraph IV 
ANDA filers from parking their 180-day exclusivity and thus delaying generic competition. 
Sixth, the MMA inserted a patent delisting counterclaim provision.
252  Under this 
provision, if an NDA holder or patent owner sues a generic drug company for patent 
infringement due to the generic applicant’s ANDA containing a Paragraph IV certification, then 
the generic company can bring a counterclaim to delist the patent or correct the patent 
information in the Orange Book.
253  In the counterclaim, the ANDA applicant can claim that the 
listed patent does not claim either the drug for which the NDA application was approved or an 
approved method of using the drug.
254  Furthermore, the statute provides that the ANDA 
applicant’s action to delist or correct an Orange Book-listed patent can only be raised as a 
counterclaim and is not an independent cause of action.
255  Furthermore, an ANDA applicant is 
not entitled to damages under this counterclaim.
256 
Seventh, the MMA added a declaratory judgment provision.
257  Under this 
provision, if an NDA holder or patent owner does not bring a patent infringement action against 
a Paragraph IV ANDA filer within forty-five days of receiving notice, the ANDA filer may, in 
accordance with the Declaratory Judgment Act,
258 bring a declaratory judgment action regarding 
                                                 
251 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(VI).   
252 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii).   
253 See id.   
254 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii)(I).   
255 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii)(II).   
256 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(iii).     
257 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(i).   
258 See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).      
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the invalidity or non-infringement of the patent which is the subject of the Paragraph IV 
certification.
259  Congress stated that the federal district courts will have subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear these declaratory judgment actions “to the extent consistent with the 
Constitution.”
260  Additionally, if the ANDA applicant is claiming non-infringement of the 
patent, the generic applicant must include in its notice a document with an offer of confidential 
access to the ANDA.
261  This access to the ANDA for the NDA holder or patent owner is only to 
be used for “the sole and limited purpose” of determining whether a patent infringement action 
should be brought with respect to the patent that is subject to the Paragraph IV certification.
262   
As one scholar stated, “The offer of access is not mandatory.  However, if it is not proffered, the 
generic applicant may not seek a declaratory judgment if it is not sued.”
263  The MMA also 
provided that an ANDA applicant is not entitled to damages in a declaratory judgment action 
brought under this provision.
264 
Eighth, the MMA required that certain patent settlement agreements entered into 
by drug companies be filed with the FTC and the DOJ.
265  Three types of agreements are 
                                                 
259 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(i)(I).   
260 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(5).  The MMA’s declaratory judgment provision is not equivalent to 
the one contained in S. 1, over which the DOJ and many Senators expressed concern about the 
provision’s constitutionality.  Instead, the declaratory judgment provision is more akin to the 
declaratory judgment provision in H.R. 1, in which a district court must find that Article III’s 
“case or controversy” requirement is satisfied to hear the case.  The DOJ expressed no concern 
about the constitutionality of such a provision.  See supra notes 225-226 and accompanying text.  
In changing the language of the final MMA provision, “[i]t appears that concerned Senate 
members felt that the ultimately enacted wording of section 1101(d) would solve [the 
constitutional] problem.”  Derzko, supra note 19, at 241.   
261 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(i)(III).   
262 Id.   
263 Bourke & Danberg, supra note 86, at 973.   
264 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(iii).     
265 MMA Title XI § 1112.    
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required to be submitted to the FTC and the DOJ: (1) an agreement between a generic company 
that has submitted an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification and a pioneer company that 
pertains to: (a) the manufacture, marketing, or sale of the pioneer drug; (b) the manufacture, 
marketing, or sale of the generic drug; or (c) any generic company’s 180-day exclusivity with 
respect to the pioneer drug;
266 (2) an agreement between two generic companies that have both 
submitted ANDAs with Paragraph IV certifications to the same listed drug that pertains to one 
company’s 180-day exclusivity period;
267 and (3) any agreements between the parties mentioned 
above that are not described above “and are contingent upon, provide a contingent condition for, 
or are otherwise related to an agreement” that is required to be filed above.
268  Any agreement 
required to be filed must be filed with the Assistant Attorney General and the FTC no later than 
ten business days after the execution of the patent settlement agreement.
269  If any pioneer or 
generic company fails to comply with the filing requirements, the company shall be liable for a 
civil penalty if a civil suit is brought by the United States or the FTC,
270 and a federal district 
court can order compliance or any other equitable relief it deems appropriate, upon the 
application of the Assistant Attorney General or the FTC.
271 
Finally, it is important to note which suggestions made during the legislative 
process were not enacted into law by the MMA.  Regarding the 180-day exclusivity provision, 
Senator Hatch’s recommendation of a “successful challenger” regime was not enacted.
272  
                                                 
266 MMA Title XI § 1112(a).   
267 MMA Title XI § 1112(b).   
268 MMA Title XI § 1112(c)(2).   
269 MMA Title XI § 1113. 
270 MMA Title XI § 1115(a). 
271 MMA Title XI § 1115(b). 
272 See supra notes 217-218 and accompanying text.      
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Instead, under the MMA, 180-day exclusivity is based on a “first-to-file” regime.  Additionally, 
Congress did not adopt the FTC’s two suggestions regarding the failure to market forfeiture 
provision.  During the August 1, 2003 Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing, the Chairman of the 
FTC recommended that the second prong of the failure to market forfeiture provision reference a 
district court decision regarding patent invalidity or non-infringement, and not an appeals court 
decision.
273  The FTC believed that “the district court decision trigger is important to encourage 
subsequent generic entry.”
274  However, the MMA’s failure to market forfeiture provision 
references an appeals court’s decision.  The language of the provision refers to “a court [that] 
enters a final decision from which no appeal (other than a petition to the Supreme Court for a 
writ of certiorari) has been or can be taken that the patent is invalid or not infringed.”
275  The 
FTC Chairman also recommended that the failure to market provision be amended so that court 
decisions dismissing a generic applicant’s declaratory judgment action for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction would trigger the first Paragraph IV ANDA filer’s 180-day exclusivity.
276  The FTC 
reasoned that “[t]his change will ensure that the 180-day period does not unreasonably block a 
subsequent generic applicant’s market entry.”
277  However, when Congress enacted the MMA, 
the language of the failure to market provision was not amended to include this suggestion. 
Furthermore, the MMA refrained from amending the Hatch-Waxman Act in 
several other ways, although none of the following reforms were extensively considered in 
Congress.  First, Congress did not create an administrative review system within FDA to 
                                                 
273 See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
274 Examining the Senate and House Versions Hearing, supra note 216, at 5 (statement of 
Timothy J. Muris, Chairman of the FTC).   
275 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(AA).   
276 See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
277 Examining the Senate and House Versions Hearing, supra note 216, at 5 (statement of 
Timothy J. Muris, Chairman of the FTC).      
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evaluate the appropriateness and accuracy of patent information submitted by NDA holders.  
Instead, Congress included the patent delisting counterclaim provision, by which a generic 
applicant could assert a counterclaim to correct or delist patent information from the Orange 
Book in the context of a patent infringement lawsuit.
278  Second, Congress did not state that 
reverse-payment settlement agreements between drug companies were per se illegal.
279  Instead, 
in line with the FTC’s recommendation, the MMA contained a provision that required certain 
patent settlement agreements between drug companies to be filed with the FTC and the DOJ for 
review of antitrust issues.
280  Third, Congress did not amend the patent term extension provisions 
of the original Hatch-Waxman Act to increase the length of patent term restoration,
281 nor did it 
amend the market exclusivity provisions of the Act.  Thus, the MMA did not increase innovator 
drug companies’ patent or market exclusivity protection in this round of Hatch-Waxman reform. 
D.  Issues Definitively Resolved by the 2003 FDA Final Rule and the 2003 MMA 
The 2003 MMA and FDA final rule definitively resolved two issues of great 
concern that arose after the passage of the original Hatch-Waxman Act.  First, prior to 2003, 
substantial debate existed between generic and innovator drug companies over the validity of 
certain patent listings in the Orange Book.  However, “FDA’s listing regulations, which are now 
in force, clarify much of the confusion that existed under the old patent listing rules.”
282  The 
2003 rule clearly mandates the listing in the Orange Book of patents claiming drug products, 
                                                 
278 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii).   
279 See Derzko, supra note 19, at 246 (“[I]t is worth noting that there has been no change in 
substantive law pertaining to what activities might and might not be anticompetitive.  Perhaps 
most notably, settlement agreements between innovators and generics or between two generics in 
the patent law area were not, for example, declared per se antitrust violations.”).     
280 See MMA Title XI § 1112. 
281 See Derzko, supra note 19, at 254 (“[T]he recent Hatch-Waxman reforms made no 
adjustments to the patent restoration period.”).   
282 Derzko, supra note 19, at 214.      
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drug substances, and approved methods of use.  The 2003 rule clearly prohibits the listing in the 
Orange Book of patents claiming intermediates, metabolites, processing, and packaging.
283  
These bright-line rules have significantly lessened the controversies over the appropriateness of 
listing various kinds of patents, especially improvement patents.  Additionally, the new 
declaration forms and the possibility of criminal penalties for listing inappropriate patent 
information both help to create adherence to these new rules.   
Second, the MMA’s revision of the thirty-month stay provision has had two 
beneficial consequences.  The MMA effectively places a limit of one thirty-month stay per 
ANDA,
284 in order to resolve patent disputes over those patents listed in the Orange Book prior 
to the filing of the ANDA.
285  First, in conjunction with the FDA rule clarifying patent listing 
requirements, this reform of the thirty-month stay provision has ameliorated the contentious 
issues over patent listings.  “[S]ince only one 30-month automatic stay will now be obtainable 
for an ANDA, there will be less incentive on the part of brand name companies to take a broad 
interpretation of what patents should be listed.”
286  Second, the reform of the thirty-month stay 
provision has halted innovator companies’ “evergreening” practice of receiving multiple thirty-
month stays and thus delaying generic competition.  After the filing of an ANDA, if an NDA 
holder decides to list a new patent in the Orange Book, the generic applicant must make a 
certification to this new patent, but under the MMA, the NDA holder is no longer entitled to 
another thirty-month stay if the generic applicant makes a Paragraph IV certification to the new 
                                                 
283 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b)(1). 
284 See supra note 233 for a discussion of how multiple thirty-month stays are still a possible, 
although rare, occurrence.   
285 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).   
286 Derzko, supra note 19, at 243.      
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patent.  Thus, “the MMA has eliminated the patent holder’s practice of gaining multiple stays to 
keep generic challengers off the market.”
287   
Third, the MMA clarified several issues with regard to the 180-day exclusivity 
provision.  The MMA makes clear that 180-day exclusivity is on a “first-to-file” basis per drug 
product and not per patent.  The MMA provides that the first generic applicant who files a 
substantially complete ANDA containing a Paragraph IV certification to a pioneer drug’s patent 
is eligible for the 180-day exclusivity period.
288  Additionally, if two ANDAs with Paragraph IV 
certifications are submitted on the same day for the same drug product, then these first generic 
applicants will receive “shared exclusivity.”  Finally, the MMA explicitly states that there is no 
roll-over exclusivity; if the first Paragraph IV ANDA filer loses its 180-day exclusivity, no other 
ANDA applicant is eligible to receive 180-day exclusivity.    
However, as will be discussed in Part V of this paper, many recent controversies 
have arisen stemming from the 2003 statutory amendments, including controversies regarding 
the failure to market forfeiture provision, the patent delisting counterclaim provision, the 
declaratory judgment action provision, and the patent settlement agreement notification 
provision. 
V.  Recent Hatch-Waxman Controversies after the Enactment of the MMA 
The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 amended the provisions of the original 
Hatch-Waxman Act, and in doing so, added several new provisions, such as the patent delisting 
counterclaim provision, the failure to market forfeiture provision, the declaratory judgment 
action provision, and the patent settlement agreement notification provision.  These new 
provisions have engendered much controversy, particularly regarding the correct interpretation 
                                                 
287 Avery, supra note 3, at 188.   
288 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).      
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of these provisions in light of the overall Hatch-Waxman structure and the correct application of 
these provisions to a variety of factual scenarios.  Daniel Troy, then-Chief Counsel of FDA, 
predicted these controversies, as illustrated by his statement during the 2003 Senate Judiciary 
Committee Hearing prior to the passage of the MMA: “As with the passage of most new laws, 
questions and ambiguities are inevitable and the courts, FDA and/or Congress will surely address 
these ambiguities as they arise.”
289   
Coupled with the problem of ambiguity in statutory language is the recurring 
problem that innovator and generic drug companies are “gaming” certain provisions of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act to their own economic benefit.  Again, then-FDA Chief Counsel Daniel 
Troy was particularly attuned to the likelihood of generic and innovator companies’ gaming any 
new provisions added by the MMA to the Hatch-Waxman Act.  At the Senate Judiciary 
Committee Hearing, Mr. Troy declared, “I know of no more of the law in which the law of 
unintended consequences operates with more force than this one . . . [E]ither way you tilt it, you 
can’t write it so clearly that there are no opportunities for gaming.”
290  Due to the unintended 
consequences of these provisions, several commentators have urged that some of these 
provisions, such as the failure to market forfeiture provision and the patent settlement agreement 
notification provision, are not achieving their intended goals, and have suggested that further 
legislative reform is necessary.   
This next Part provides a comprehensive analysis of the new Hatch-Waxman 
issues that have arisen since the 2003 statutory amendments.  These unintended consequences 
and new controversies, which will be covered in the next six sections, include: (1) the effect of 
                                                 
289 Barry J. Marenberg, Changes to the Hatch-Waxman Act Following the “Medicare 
Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003,” 23 BIOTECH. L. REP. 277, 280 
(2004).   
290 2003 Hearing, supra note 1, at 8, 15 (statement of Daniel E. Troy, Chief Counsel, FDA).      
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patent delisting on a first generic applicant’s 180-day exclusivity; (2) the effect of patent 
expiration on a first generic applicant’s 180-day exclusivity; (3) the interpretation of the patent 
delisting counterclaim provision; (4) the application of the declaratory judgment action 
provision; (5) the legality of patent settlement agreements; and (6) the issue of authorized 
generics.   
A.  The Effect of Patent Delisting on 180-Day Exclusivity 
With the passage of the MMA, Congress intended to prevent first generic 
applicants from “parking” their 180-day exclusivity and thus delaying the entry of generic 
competitors onto the market.  Congress’s main avenue to achieve this goal was through the 
addition of forfeiture events to the Hatch-Waxman Act.
 291  If a forfeiture event occurred, then a 
first generic applicant would lose its 180-day exclusivity.  The main forfeiture event is contained 
in the complex failure to market forfeiture provision.  This provision states that the first 
Paragraph IV ANDA applicant will forfeit its 180-day exclusivity if it fails to market the drug by 
the later of: (1) 75 days after the ANDA is approved, or 30 months after the ANDA is filed, 
whichever is earlier; or (2) 75 days after one of the following has occurred: (i) a court enters a 
decision, from which no appeal has been or can be taken, that finds the pioneer’s patent is either 
invalid or not infringed; (ii) a court approves a settlement agreement that includes a finding that 
the pioneer’s patent is either invalid or not infringed; or (iii) the patent holder withdraws the 
patent information from the Orange Book.
292   
FDA has not yet issued regulations clarifying the scope and interpretation of the 
MMA failure to market forfeiture provision.  However, FDA has issued several decision letters 
on this subject, which have shed some light on the interpretation and application of this 
                                                 
291 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D).   
292 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I).      
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provision.  For instance, in a Letter to Marc A. Goshko, Executive Director of Teva North 
America, FDA explained its interpretation of this complicated provision: 
We find that under the plain language of the statute, 180-day exclusivity is not 
forfeited for failure to market when an event under subpart (aa) has occurred, but 
- as in this case - none of the events in subpart (bb) has occurred.  The “failure to 
market” provision results in forfeiture when there are two dates on the basis of 
which FDA may identify the “later” event as described in section 
505(j)(5)(D)(i)(I).  The provision does not effect a forfeiture when an event under 
subpart (aa) has occurred, but no event under subpart (bb) has yet occurred.
293  
 
Pursuant to FDA’s interpretation of this provision, a date under each prong of the failure to 
market provision must have occurred, in order to calculate the “later of” date.   
Even though FDA has clarified some aspects of the failure to market provision in 
individual decision letters, this provision has still led to much debate.  One controversy that has 
arisen relates to the effect of an NDA holder’s delisting of a certified patent from the Orange 
Book on an ANDA applicant’s 180-day exclusivity.  This situation arises when a first generic 
applicant submits an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification to a pioneer drug’s patent – 
making it eligible for 180-day exclusivity.  The pioneer company then requests that FDA delist 
this patent, and FDA delists the patent.  The second component of the failure to market provision 
is satisfied if the first generic applicant fails to market the drug within 75 days after the NDA 
holder withdraws the patent information from the Orange Book, or in other words, after the NDA 
holder delists the patent.
294  The question is, then, does the NDA holder’s delisting of the 
certified patent destroy the generic company’s Paragraph IV certification and, with it, its 180-day 
exclusivity?  As one commentator noted, “[g]eneric firms had once championed patent delistings 
                                                 
293 FDA, Letter to Marc A. Goshko, RE: Docket No. 2007N-0389, ANDA 77-165: Granisetron 
Hydrochloride Injection (Jan. 17, 2008), at 5.  For another FDA decision letter regarding the 
failure to market forfeiture provision, see FDA, Dear ANDA Applicant Letter (Hi-Tech), RE: 
Docket No. FDA-2008-N-0483 (Oct. 28, 2008).   
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as [a] means to faster approval, but now see them as threatening their most valuable asset, 180-
day exclusivity.”
295  FDA and the federal courts have recently addressed this important issue.   
1.  Background on Patent Delisting 
In Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. v. Leavitt,
296 a case involving the effect of patent 
delisting on a generic applicant’s 180-day exclusivity prior to the MMA amendments, Ranbaxy 
and Ivax (the latter being acquired by Teva) submitted ANDAs containing Paragraph IV 
certifications to two patents covering Merck’s listed drug Zocor.
297  After these filings, Merck 
requested that FDA delist the two challenged patents.  FDA delisted the two patents from the 
Orange Book, resulting in Ranbaxy and Ivax losing 180-day marketing exclusivity.
298  The 
generic companies filed citizen petitions requesting that FDA relist the patents.
299  However, 
FDA rejected the petitions because Merck had not initiated patent infringement suits against 
Ranbaxy and Teva.
300  The generic companies sued in district court, and the court entered 
summary judgment for the generic companies.  On appeal, the D.C. Circuit considered the 
Chevron step one question of “whether the FDA may delist a patent upon the request of the 
[brand manufacturer] after a generic manufacturer has filed an ANDA containing a paragraph IV 
certification so that the effect of delisting is to deprive the applicant of a period of marketing 
exclusivity.”
301  The court held that FDA’s delisting policy was contrary to the text and structure 
                                                 
295 M. Nielsen Hobbs, 180-Day Exclusivity Ruling on Cosopt Signals Need for Strong Patent 
Challenges, THE PINK SHEET (Nov. 3, 2008).   
296 469 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir. 2006).   
297 Id. at 121.   
298 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12)(viii)(B) (requiring that when a patent is removed from the 
Orange Book, the ANDA filer must delete its paragraph IV certification with regard to the 
delisted patent).   
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of the Hatch-Waxman Act, and contrary to the purpose of the Act, as it “diminishes the incentive 
for a manufacturer of generic drugs to challenge a patent listed in the Orange Book.”
302  
Therefore, the Court affirmed the district court and held that “FDA improperly denied Ranbaxy 
and Teva a period of marketing exclusivity by delisting Merck’s patents.”
303 
The Ranbaxy Court only interpreted the Hatch-Waxman Act prior to the 2003 
MMA amendments.  Since the 2003 amendments, three scenarios similar to the Ranbaxy fact 
pattern have arisen.  The first fact pattern involved the generic company Cobalt Pharmaceuticals 
and Bayer’s brand-name drug Precose.  The second fact pattern involved the generic company 
Hi-Tech Pharmacal Co. and Merck’s brand-name drug Cosopt.  In both instances, the generic 
companies argued that in the revised Hatch-Waxman framework, a generic company that files an 
ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification to a listed patent should be entitled to exclusivity even 
if the NDA holder then requests that FDA delist the patent.   
FDA rejected these arguments and refused to apply the Ranbaxy rule.
304  Instead, 
FDA based its decision on the failure to market forfeiture provision added by the MMA.
305  FDA 
stated that with respect to both Cobalt and Hi-Tech, the delisting of the patent by the NDA 
holder led to a forfeiture event for failure to market because “[t]he patent information submitted 
under subsection (b) or (c) of this section [was] withdrawn by the holder of the application 
approved under subsection (b).”
306  FDA stated that under the plain language of the statute, the 
                                                 
302 Id. at 126.   
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304 See FDA, Dear ANDA Applicant Letter (Hi-Tech), supra note 293; FDA, Letter to William A. 
Rakoczy (Cobalt), RE: ANDA No. 77-532 (May 7, 2008).      
305 See FDA, Dear ANDA Applicant Letter (Hi-Tech), supra note 293, at 16; FDA, Letter to 
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second trigger under the failure to market provision is satisfied seventy-five days after the 
innovator company delists the challenged patent.
307  Both Cobalt and Hi-Tech sought review of 
FDA’s policy in district court but were denied relief.   
2.  Teva v. Sebelius 
The third fact pattern – in the case of Teva v. Sebelius
308 – involved the generic 
company Teva and Merck’s brand-name drugs Cozaar and Hyzaar.
309  Merck’s blockbuster 
hypertension drugs Cozaar (losartan) and Hyzaar (losartan and hydrochlorothiazide) generated 
$3.6 billion globally in 2008.
310  In 2003 and 2004, Teva filed ANDAs for Cozaar and Hyzaar 
that made Paragraph IV certifications to Merck’s U.S. Patent No. 5,608,075 (the “‘075 patent”), 
which expires in 2014.
311  After Teva filed its ANDAs, Merck chose not to initiate patent 
infringement litigation, and instead, in March 2005, Merck requested that FDA delist the ‘075 
patent from the Orange Book.  FDA removed the patent but did not make this action public until 
April 18, 2008.
312  In the meantime, FDA tentatively approved both of Teva’s ANDAs for 
Cozaar and Hyzaar.  Additionally, FDA tentatively approved Apotex’s subsequent Paragraph IV 
ANDA for Hyzaar.  However, under FDA’s interpretation of the failure to market forfeiture 
provision as indicated in the Cobalt and Hi-Tech matters, Teva had forfeited 180-day marketing 
exclusivity for Hyzaar and Cozaar – seventy-five days from the date of the delisting of the 
                                                 
307 See FDA, Dear ANDA Applicant Letter (Hi-Tech), supra note 293, at 14 n.15 (“Section 
505(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(CC) applies to more than just those patents withdrawn as a result of a 
counterclaim. . . . FDA reads the plain language of 505(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(CC) to apply whenever 
a patent is withdrawn (or requested to be ‘delisted’) by the NDA holder.”).   
308 595 F.3d 1303 (D.C. Cir. 2010).   
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310 Brenda Sandburg, ANDA Exclusivity Protected From Patent Delisting Under Appeals Court 
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patents.
313  In 2009, Teva sued the Secretary of HHS, Kathleen Sebelius, in district court seeking 
a declaratory judgment rejecting FDA’s policy and an injunction requiring that FDA grant Teva 
180-day exclusivity on April 6, 2010 (the date generic losartan competition was to begin after 
Merck’s pediatric exclusivity expired).
314  After finding that the claim was ripe and Teva had 
standing, the District Court for the District of Columbia ruled in favor of FDA on the merits.
315  
The D.C. Circuit agreed with the district court that the action was justiciable but 
reversed the district court’s decision on the merits, holding that FDA’s policy was contrary to the 
structure of the Hatch-Waxman Act.  In an opinion by Judge Williams, the court first addressed 
the ripeness and standing issues.  In terms of ripeness, the court held that Teva’s suit satisfied 
both the fitness and hardship prongs of the ripeness inquiry.  Teva’s claim was “purely legal,” as 
it pertained solely to statutory interpretation,
316 and Teva would suffer hardship, “a near-certain 
loss of the first mover advantage to which the company claims entitlement,” if judicial review 
were postponed.
317  In terms of standing, the court held that Teva had satisfied all three elements, 
including the injury prong.  The court stated that “Teva faces an imminent threat of . . . the 
impending prospect of allegedly unlawful competition in the relevant market.”
318  Even though 
the FDA policy that Teva challenges is embodied “not in a rulemaking but in two adjudications 
to which Teva was not a party,” the circuit court held that Teva had standing.
319 
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Regarding the merits of the case, Teva put forward two arguments that countered 
FDA’s policy that an NDA holder’s request for delisting of a patent constitutes a forfeiture event 
under the failure to market forfeiture provision.  First, in a linguistic analysis, Teva argued that 
the patent delisting forfeiture provision of the Act
320 must be read together with the patent 
delisting counterclaim provision.
321  Teva explained that the 2003 MMA patent delisting 
counterclaim provision “is the only portion of the statute that explicitly provides for the delisting 
of a patent after it has been challenged in an ANDA. . . . [T]hat singular reference requires the 
conclusion that the counterclaim provision describes the only scenario in which the FDA may 
delist a challenged patent.”
322  However, the court held that although this was a plausible reading 
of the Act, FDA rightly pointed out that “there is simply no express preclusion of non-
counterclaim delistings, or of such delistings’ triggering forfeiture.”
323 
However, the court was persuaded by Teva’s incentive structure argument, based 
on the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Ranbaxy.  In Ranbaxy, the court stated, “FDA may not, 
however, change the incentive structure adopted by the Congress.”
324  The circuit court held that 
FDA’s policy fails at Chevron step one because the agency’s interpretation was incorrect that the 
failure to market forfeiture provision
325 changed the statute’s incentive structure such that 
Ranbaxy no longer applies.  The court explained that “the agency, however, offers not a single 
cogent reason why Congress might have permitted brand manufacturers to trigger subsection 
(CC) by withdrawing a challenged patent, outside the counterclaim scenario identified by 
                                                 
320 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(CC).   
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Teva.”
326  The D.C. Circuit reversed the district court and remanded the case for further 
proceedings on appropriate relief for Teva.
327  Judge Henderson dissented, stating that the case is 
not ripe for review until after FDA issues its final decision either granting or denying Teva’s 
ANDA.
328   
3.  Reaction to Teva v. Sebelius 
The Pink Sheet reported that “[t]he appeals court decision will have a broad 
impact as generic manufacturers will no longer be stripped of marketing exclusivity if a brand 
name company delists a patent in FDA’s Orange Book.”
329  The Pink Sheet stated that since 
January 27, 2009, patents covering eleven pioneer drugs had been delisted.  These brand-name 
drugs include Merck’s Vytorin to lower cholesterol, Johnson & Johnson’s Risperdal Consta for 
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder treatment, and Amylin’s Symlin for diabetes treatment.
330  
One attorney stated that the Sebelius decision indicates the D.C. Circuit’s willingness “to pay 
attention to Congressional intent and the impact of FDA’s decision on the balance struck by 
Hatch-Waxman.”
331  On the other hand, another attorney “said the decision ‘strained the logic of 
Chevron’ to get the desired result.”
332  On April 5, FDA filed a petition for a panel rehearing and 
rehearing en banc, which the D.C. Circuit denied on May 17, 2010.
333   
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B.  The Effect of Patent Expiration on 180-Day Exclusivity 
Related to the issue of whether voluntary patent delisting by the NDA holder 
constitutes a forfeiture event is the issue of whether patent expiration (other than natural 
expiration) constitutes a forfeiture event under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(VI).  This statutory 
provision, added to the Hatch-Waxman Act by the MMA, states that the first Paragraph IV 
ANDA filer forfeits 180-day exclusivity if “[a]ll of the patents as to which the applicant 
submitted a certification qualifying it for the 180-day exclusivity period have expired.”
334  FDA 
has recently interpreted this provision in light of the Sebelius decision, concluding that patent 
expiration for nonpayment of fees does not affect a first ANDA filer’s eligibility for 180-day 
exclusivity.  However, FDA’s reasoning in its decision letter has sparked significant controversy. 
1.  FDA’s Decision Letter on the Expiration of Merck’s ‘075 Patent 
On the same facts of Teva v. Sebelius,
335 Teva and other generic companies filed 
ANDAs for Merck’s hypertension drugs Cozaar and Hyzaar, containing Paragraph IV 
certifications to Merck’s ‘075 patent.  While the Sebelius litigation concerning FDA’s delisting 
of the ‘075 patent was pending, a new issue arose with respect to the ‘075 patent.  “Apotex 
notified FDA on March 9, 2010, that records of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) 
showed that the ‘075 patent had expired no later than March 30, 2009, due to non-payment of 
fees.”
336  On March 12, 2010, Merck informed FDA that the expiration date for the ‘075 patent 
was incorrect and should be revised from March 4, 2014, to March 4, 2009.
337  FDA then 
updated the Orange Book to reflect the correct March 4, 2009 expiration date.   
                                                 
334 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(VI).   
335 595 F.3d 1303 (D.C. Cir. 2010).   
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On March 11, 2010, FDA sent a letter to ANDA applicants and opened a public 
docket for comments on the issue of patent expiration due to failure to pay fees and its effect on 
180-day exclusivity.  On March 26, 2010, FDA issued its 8-page decision letter to ANDA 
applicants addressing whether the expiration of patents for failure to pay fees constitutes a 
forfeiture event under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(VI).  FDA first considered the question “on a 
clean slate,” as if the Sebelius decision had never occurred.
338  FDA stated that the text of the 
patent expiration forfeiture event provision does not distinguish between natural expiration and 
other types of expiration.  Therefore, under a plain reading of the statute, FDA concluded that “it 
would interpret the statute so that patent expiration for any reason is a patent expiration 
forfeiture event.”
339 
However, FDA then went on to state that it was obligated to consider the D.C. 
Circuit’s decision in Teva v. Sebelius in determining whether patent expiration for failure to pay 
fees constitutes a forfeiture event.  FDA stated that, in Sebelius, the court reasoned that “the 
structure of the MMA exclusivity provisions . . . does not permit an NDA holder to ‘unilaterally’ 
deprive the generic applicant of its exclusivity on the basis of delisting.”
340  Thus, FDA 
concluded that this analysis “appears to preclude a forfeiture of exclusivity on the basis of a 
patent expiration where the expiration is in the control of the NDA holder.”
341  The agency 
concluded that, in light of the Sebelius decision, the expiration of Merck’s ‘075 patent did not 
result in a forfeiture of the first ANDA filer’s (Teva’s) eligibility for 180-day exclusivity for 
Cozaar and Hyzaar.  FDA concluded the letter with this contentious statement: “The Agency 
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makes this finding even though it is not the result that FDA, as the agency that administers the 
statute, believes is appropriate given the relevant statutory language or the policies underlying 
the statute.”
342   
2.  Aftermath of FDA’s Decision Letter 
One commentator noted that FDA’s March 26, 2010 decision letter was an 
“interesting strategic move by the Agency.”
343  Although ultimately concluding that patent 
expiration due to the failure to pay maintenance fees was not a forfeiture event, FDA spent the 
majority of the letter rejecting that decision.  “FDA’s letter decision is clearly a plea for other 
interested parties to challenge the Agency’s decision.”
344  This commentator’s prediction proved 
to be correct.  After FDA issued its decision letter, Apotex and Roxane brought suit against FDA 
in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a preliminary injunction to stop 
FDA from granting Teva 180-day marketing exclusivity.
345  The generic companies argued that 
FDA’s decision letter violated the FD&C Act and the Administrative Procedure Act.  Teva 
intervened in the case arguing against Apotex and Roxane’s position that FDA’s adherence to 
Sebelius’s reasoning was arbitrary and capricious.
346  On April 2, 2010, Judge Collyer issued an 
opinion denying the generic companies’ preliminary injunction motion.
347  On April 6, 2010, 
FDA approved Teva’s ANDAs, granting Teva 180-day exclusivity on the generic versions of 
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Hyzaar and Cozaar.
348  Apotex appealed to the D.C. Circuit, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed the 
decision of the district court on July 6, 2010.
349  Apotex filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on 
October 4, 2010, which was denied by the Supreme Court on January 18, 2011.
350 
C.  Patent Delisting Counterclaim Provision 
The MMA added a provision to the Hatch-Waxman Act that allows a generic 
manufacturer in a Paragraph IV infringement suit to assert a counterclaim against the innovator 
company challenging the accuracy and correctness of the innovator drug’s patent information 
listed in the Orange Book.
351  The provision states that the ANDA “applicant may assert a 
counterclaim seeking an order requiring the holder to correct or delete the patent information 
submitted by the holder under subsection (b) or (c) of this section on the ground that the patent 
does not claim either – (aa) the drug for which the application was approved; or (bb) an approved 
method of using the drug.”
352  Recently, the scope of this counterclaim provision, as it pertained 
to a method of use patent, came under scrutiny by the Federal Circuit in Novo Nordisk A/S v. 
Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd.
353 
1.  Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. 
Novo Nordisk A/S and Novo Nordisk, Inc. (“Novo”) sell the brand-name drug 
Prandin, which is “an adjunct to diet and exercise to improve glycemic control in adults with 
type 2 diabetes.”
354  Prandin (repaglinide) has three FDA-approved uses: (1) monotherapy (use 
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of repaglinide by itself); (2) repaglinide in combination with metformin; and (3) repaglinide in 
combination with thiazolidinediones.
355  There are two patent listings for Prandin in FDA’s 
Orange Book.  U.S. Patent No. 37,035 claims the chemical composition of repaglinide, and the 
patent expired on March 14, 2009.  U.S. Patent No. 6,677,358 (the “’358 patent”) claims “[a] 
method for treating non-insulin dependent diabetes mellitus (NIDDM) comprising administering 
to a patient in need of such treatment repaglinide in combination with metformin,” and the patent 
expires on June 12, 2018.
356  This method of use patent was assigned the use code “U-546” by 
FDA and the use code narrative read “[u]se of repaglinide in combination with metformin to 
lower blood glucose.”
357  Novo does not own the patents claiming the other two FDA-approved 
uses of repaglinide.
358 
In February 2005, Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. (“Caraco”) filed an 
ANDA for repaglinide, making a Paragraph IV certification to the ’358 patent.  Within 45 days, 
Novo brought a patent infringement action against Caraco.  In April 2008, Caraco filed an 
amended ANDA to FDA: an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification to the ’358 patent and a 
section viii statement
359 carving out the use of repaglinide in combination with metformin.
360  
Caraco also “stipulated that its ANDA would infringe the ’358 patent if it included a label that 
discussed the combination of repaglinide and metformin.”
361  FDA approved Caraco’s section 
viii statement.  Then, in May 2009, Novo updated its use code narrative in the Orange Book for 
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the ’358 patent by submitting to FDA a changed Form 3542.  Pursuant to this form, FDA 
changed the U-546 use code to “U-968” and inserted Novo’s new use code narrative: “A method 
of improving glycemic control in adults with type 2 diabetes mellitus.”
362  As a result of this 
broader use code narrative, FDA reconsidered Caraco’s section viii statement.  FDA rejected 
Caraco’s carve-out label because it overlapped with the U-968 use code for the ’358 patent.
363   
In June 2009, Caraco asserted a counterclaim under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii), 
challenging Novo’s changed use code and requesting a court order that Novo change the use 
code for the ’358 patent back to the U-546 use code.  Caraco argued that the U-968 use code was 
“overbroad because it incorrectly suggested that the ’358 patent covered all three approved 
methods of using repaglinide even though it claimed only one approved method.”
364  In addition, 
Caraco asserted a patent misuse defense related to the ’358 patent’s use code narrative.   
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted 
Caraco’s motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim, but did not rule on the patent 
misuse defense.  The court agreed with Caraco’s reasoning that Novo’s U-968 use code was 
overbroad.
365  The court stated, “Novo is not a private FDA.  Novo, by the change in the use 
code narrative is attempting to extend the life of an expired patent.”
366  The district court held 
that Caraco was entitled to an injunction directing Novo to submit an amended Form 3542 to 
FDA to change Novo’s use code for the ’358 patent back to the U-546 use code.
367   
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A panel of the Federal Circuit granted Novo’s motion for expedited review and 
noted that this was the first time the court had interpreted the counterclaim provision.  The circuit 
court reversed the district court’s grant of an injunction.  The court reasoned that Caraco did “not 
have a statutory basis to assert a counterclaim requesting such injunctive relief [for the change of 
the use code narrative].”
368  Judge Rader wrote the opinion of the court and interpreted the 
counterclaim provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act.  He based his holding – that Caraco was not 
entitled to a changed use code under the counterclaim provision – on two grounds.  First, the 
court began by analyzing the meaning of “an approved method” in 21 U.S.C. § 
355(j)(5)(C)(ii)(I).  Novo argued that “an approved method” meant any approved method, 
meaning that Caraco was entitled to the counterclaim only if the patent does not claim any 
approved methods.
369  However, Caraco argued that “an approved method” meant all approved 
methods, such that Caraco was entitled to the counterclaim if the patent does not claim the other 
two approved methods.
370  Judge Rader found the statutory provision to be unambiguous, with 
“an” meaning “any.”  Additionally, the court looked at the legislative history of the counterclaim 
provision, which indicated that the provision was only meant to correct the specific problem in 
Mylan v. Thompson,
371 where an innovator company listed a patent unrelated to the drug product 
or method.
372  The Novo court held that the “Hatch-Waxman Act authorizes a counterclaim only 
if the listed patent does not claim any approved methods of using the listed drug.”
373 
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Second, the court held that the term “patent information,” as used in the 
counterclaim provision,
374 is defined by the Act to mean only “the patent number and the 
expiration date.”
375  Because the statute only refers to “the patent number and the expiration 
date,” Judge Rader stated that patent information could only mean just this information.  Thus, 
the court found that “the counterclaim provision only authorizes suits to correct or delete an 
erroneous patent number or expiration date.”
376  Therefore, there was no statutory authorization 
for Caraco to assert a counterclaim challenging Novo’s use code. 
In a concurrence, Judge Clevenger, agreeing with Judge Rader’s statutory 
interpretation, stated that Caraco’s complaint should not lie with Novo but with FDA.  “Novo did 
nothing that was illegal or forbidden. . . . But FDA, acting independently, gummed up the works 
[by] requiring a single broad indication for repaglinide as part of the approved labeling.”
377  
Also, Judge Clevenger commented on the appropriate institution to correct this issue when he 
stated: “Congress is the appropriate entity to readjust, if necessary, the delicate balance it has 
struck between original drug manufacturers and their generic counterparts.”
378 
In a 28-page dissent, Judge Dyk disagreed with Judge Rader’s interpretation of 
the statutory terms “an approved method” and “patent information.”  Judge Dyk declared: 
Today’s decision strikingly limits the counterclaim provision with the 
consequence that, in all likelihood, the ANDA applicant is left without any 
remedy to correct an erroneous Orange Book listing with respect to a method of 
use patent. . . . [T]he majority’s crabbed view of the statute sanctions an 
unjustified manipulation of the Orange Book.
379   
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First, the dissent stated that, contrary to the majority opinion, there is no definition of “patent 
information” in the statute.  Judge Dyk argued that the statutory language demands that the 
“scope of the patent must be accurately described,” which constitutes patent information.
380  
Additionally, he stated that there is no statutory language that distinguishes between drug 
information and method of use information, making “all Orange Book information . . . ‘patent 
information.’”
381   
Second, the dissent disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of “an approved 
method” as any approved method.  Judge Dyk stated that “an approved method” means an 
approved method of use listed by the NDA holder in the Orange Book.  The dissent believed that 
“if the submitted Orange Book information claims patent coverage for an approved drug not 
covered by the patent or a method of use not covered by the patent, that information may be 
corrected.”
382  The dissent asserted that this case illustrates Novo’s manipulation of the Orange 
Book to prevent generic competition, which “the counterclaim provision was designed to 
avoid.”
383  Finally, Judge Dyk stated that the majority opinion is contrary to the policy of the 
recent D.C. Circuit decision in Sebelius,
384 because Judge Rader’s holding that Caraco’s 
counterclaim is not available is “unsuppoorted by any cogent reason for leaving an ANDA 
applicant without a remedy to correct an erroneous Orange Book patent listing with respect to a 
method of use patent.”
385   
                                                 
380 Id. at 1371.   
381 Id. at 1373.  
382 Id. at 1377.   
383 Id. at 1378.   
384 595 F.3d 1303 (D.C. Cir. 2010).     
385 Novo, 601 F.3d at 1382.    
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2.  Aftermath of Novo  
After the Novo decision, Caraco petitioned the Federal Circuit for a rehearing en 
banc.  The Pink Sheet reported that “[t]he generic industry has lined up against Novo Nordisk’s 
maneuver to keep Caraco Pharmaceuticals from getting approval,” as Apotex, Mylan, Impax, 
Teva, and the Generic Pharmaceutical Association submitted amicus briefs in support of 
Caraco’s petition.
386  Apotex and Impax stated that “Novo voluntarily changed its description 
immediately after FDA approved Caraco’s request to carve out non-infringing uses of Novo’s 
drugs.”
387  The Pink Sheet observed that the generic industry believes that the Novo decision will 
have a broad impact on ANDA litigation.  Caraco’s attorney asserted that the “Federal Circuit 
decision is endorsing what seems to be a blatant regulatory abuse.  If it stands, this tactic will 
become the next best way to block generics.”
388 
The Federal Circuit denied Caraco’s petition for a rehearing en banc on July 29, 
2010.
389  In dissent, Judge Gajarsa, with whom Judge Dyk joined, stated that “[t]he majority's 
opinion construes the counterclaim provision contrary to its manifest Congressional purpose.  
That construction renders 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii) (“Section viii”) carve-out statements a 
virtual nullity and leaves generic drug manufacturers without a remedy to challenge inaccurate 
Orange Book listings with respect to method of use patents.”
390  Caraco filed a petition for a writ 
                                                 
386 Brenda Sandburg, “The Next Best Way To Block Generics” May Be Novo’s Patent Use Code 
Switch, THE PINK SHEET, June 7, 2010.   
387 Id.   
388 Id.   
389 Novo, 615 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. July 29, 2010).    
390 Id. at 1375 – 76 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting).      
  72 
 
 
of certiorari in December 2010.  On March 28, 2011, the Supreme Court asked for the United 
States’s views on whether it should hear the case.
391   
Several commentators have noted that possible Congressional intervention may 
be warranted regarding the patent delisting counterclaim provision.  Stemming from Judge 
Clevenger’s statement that Congress is the appropriate body to “readjust” the balance struck by 
the Hatch-Waxman Act, the Orange Book Blog observed that “[p]erhaps Congress will ‘readjust’ 
the Act” with respect to the counterclaim provision.
392  The FDA Law Blog also speculated 
about whether Congress will further amend the Hatch-Waxman Act with regard to the patent 
delisting counterclaim provision.
393  The controversy over patent use codes and the patent 
delisting counterclaim provision might increase in the future, as one commentator noted that the 
number of patent use codes in the Orange Book has doubled over the past several years, from 
546 in 2004 to 1026 in 2010.
394   
                                                 
391 High Court Asks U.S. for Views on Use of Hatch-Waxman Counterclaim Provision, BNA 
PHARM. L. & INDUS. REP. (Apr. 1, 2011).  
392 Jim Wasicak & Aaron Barkoff, Federal Circuit Vacates Injunction that Directed Novo 
Nordisk to Revise Patent Use Code for Prandin, ORANGE BOOK BLOG (Apr. 15, 2010), 
http://www.orangebookblog.com/2010/04/federal-circuit-vacates-injunction-that-directed-novo-
nordisk-to-revise-orange-book-patent-use-code-for-prandin.html.   
393 Kurt R. Karst, Federal Circuit Reverses District Court Decision in Patent Delisting 
Counterclaim Case; All Orange Book Information is Not “Patent Information,” FDA LAW BLOG 
(Apr. 15, 2010 7:04 AM), http://www.fdalawblog.net/ fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2010/ 
04/federal-circuit-reverses-district-court-decision-in-patent-delisting-counterclaim-case-all-
orange-bo.html. 
394 Kurt R. Karst, Analysis Shows Patent Use Codes Have Doubled Since August 2003, FDA 
LAW BLOG (July 8, 2010 1:25 PM), 
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2010/07/ analysis-shows-patent-use-
codes-have-doubled-since-august-2003--by-kurt-r-karst-
httpwwwhpmcomvattorneycfmrid22.html.      
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D.  Declaratory Judgment Actions 
Another recent area of controversy concerns the MMA’s addition of a declaratory 
judgment action provision to the Hatch-Waxman Act.
395  Under this provision, if the NDA 
holder or patent owner does not bring a patent infringement action against a Paragraph IV 
ANDA filer within forty-five days of receiving notice, the generic applicant can sue to obtain a 
declaratory judgment that the patent listed in the Orange Book is invalid or not infringed.
396   
Congress extended federal subject matter jurisdiction to these civil actions “to the extent 
consistent with the Constitution.”
397  Therefore, federal courts have jurisdiction over declaratory 
judgment actions that present a “case or controversy” under Article III of the Constitution.   
Several commentators have noted the importance of this provision to the Hatch-
Waxman scheme.  One commentator noted that the declaratory judgment provision “will help 
resolve patent disputes and clear the way to the introduction of new generic drugs by eliminating 
patents that are deemed by courts to be invalid or not infringed.”
398  Additionally, during a 
Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing before the passage of the MMA, the Chief Counsel of FDA 
explained that “[g]enerics, for good reasons, want more certainty . . . before they launch.”
399  
Furthermore, in another Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing, Senator Schumer announced the 
importance of the declaratory judgment action provision to the entirety of the MMA reform, “I 
want to stress the importance of the declaratory judgment provision in this bill.  It is key to 
                                                 
395 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(i).   
396 Id.   
397 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(5).   
398 Derzko, supra note 19, at 241. 
399 2003 Hearing, supra note 1, at 11 (statement of Daniel E. Troy, Chief Counsel, FDA).      
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making the system work.  There is not currently a clear pathway for a generic drug company to 
get a declaratory judgment to show that they do not infringe a patent.”
400 
Since the passage of the MMA, substantial controversy has arisen regarding when 
a generic applicant meets the “case or controversy” requirement of Article III.  Since 2003, the 
federal courts’ jurisprudence over when the “case or controversy” requirement is met in 
declaratory judgment actions relating to patent disputes has changed substantially.  This section 
of the paper explains the evolution of the courts’ Article III jurisprudence with respect to 
declaratory judgment actions over patent disputes and then considers the recent controversies 
that have arisen regarding the declaratory judgment action provision.  Particularly, after the 
Supreme Court broadened the declaratory judgment standard in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, 
Inc.,
401 various court decisions on whether a Paragraph IV filer satisfies the “case or 
controversy” requirement “suggest that the law may still be unsettled in this area and that small 
nuances can make a big difference in results.”
402 
1.  Teva Pharmaceuticals, USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc. 
When the MMA was passed in December 2003, the federal courts’ standard to 
determine whether Article III was satisfied in declaratory judgment actions over patent disputes 
was the “reasonable-apprehension-of-suit” test.
403  Under this test, the court determined whether 
the generic applicant had a reasonable apprehension that the patent owner would sue for patent 
infringement, and if the court determined that there was a reasonable apprehension, Article III 
                                                 
400 Examining the Senate and House Versions Hearing, supra note 216, at 16 (statement of 
Senator Charles E. Schumer).   
401 549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
402 Patel, supra note 19, at 1109.  
403 See Examining the Senate and House Versions Hearing, supra note 216, at 12 (statement of 
Sheldon Bradshaw, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, OLC, DOJ).      
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was satisfied.
404   This test was reaffirmed by the Federal Circuit’s decision in Teva 
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc.
405  The court stated that under the test, “there must be 
both (1) an explicit threat or other action by the patentee which creates a reasonable 
apprehension on the part of the declaratory judgment plaintiff that it will face an infringement 
suit, and (2) present activity by the declaratory judgment plaintiff which could constitute 
infringement.”
406  Applying this test, the court held that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction 
over the declaratory judgment action because the generic company did not have a reasonable 
apprehension of suit by the NDA holder.  One commentator stated that this test was “stringent,” 
leading to most declaratory judgment actions being dismissed.
407 
2.  MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.  
In MedImmune, the Supreme Court rejected the reasonable-apprehension-of-suit 
test to determine if a justiciable controversy existed in a declaratory judgment action.
408  The 
Court in MedImmune stated that in analyzing whether a declaratory judgment action satisfies the 
“case or controversy” requirement under Article III, the appropriate test is based on “all the 
circumstances.”
409  The Court determined that the analysis entails assessing “whether the facts 
alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties 
having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a 
declaratory judgment.”
410  Also, the Court explained that the dispute must be “‘definite and 
                                                 
404 Id. 
405 395 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005).   
406 Id. at 1330. 
407 Patel, supra note 19, at 1093.   
408 MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 132 n.11.   
409 Id. at 127.    
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concrete . . . and that it [must] be ‘real and substantial’ and ‘admi[t] of specific relief through a 
decree of a conclusive character.”
411 
The MedImmune decision “relaxed the declaratory judgment test,” and therefore 
“declaratory judgments became a more viable option for Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA 
filers.”
412  In Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp.,
413 the Federal 
Circuit applied MedImmune’s totality of the circumstances test to a Paragraph IV ANDA filer’s 
declaratory judgment action.
414  In this case, Novartis’s drug Famvir had five patent listings in 
the Orange Book.  Teva filed an ANDA with Paragraph IV certifications to all five patents; 
however, Novartis only brought an infringement action against Teva on the base patent.
415  Teva 
then brought a declaratory judgment action on the unasserted patents,
416 and Novartis moved to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, contending that there was no case or controversy 
under Article III.  The district court dismissed the suit based on the reasonable-apprehension-of-
suit test.  However, on appeal, the Federal Circuit applied MedImmune’s test and found a 
justiciable controversy between the parties.
417  The court held that a “justiciable declaratory 
judgment controversy arises for an ANDA filer when a patentee lists patents in the Orange Book, 
the ANDA applicant files its ANDA certifying the listed patents under paragraph IV, and the 
patentee brings an action against the submitted ANDA on one or more of the patents.”
418   
                                                 
411 Id. 
412 Patel, supra note 19, at 1102.   
413 482 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007).   
414 Id. at 1342.    
415 Id. at 1334.   
416 Id. at 1335.   
417 Novartis, 482 F.3d at 1346.    
418 Id. at 1344.      
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3.  Recent Court Decisions: Covenants Not to Sue 
Since MedImmune and Novartis and the adoption of the all-the-circumstances 
test, some innovator companies have granted to subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA filers 
covenants not to sue either on all of the patents listed in the Orange Book or any patents not sued 
upon in infringement actions.
419  This practice of granting covenants not to sue with respect to 
certain patents has raised the legal question of whether covenants not to sue vitiate generic drug 
companies’ declaratory judgment action jurisdiction.  Two Federal Circuit decisions in 2008 and 
later district court decisions illustrate how “the treatment [by courts] of covenants not to sue 
seems unsettled, as it is a very new area.”
420   
In Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Forest Laboratories, Inc.,
421 
Forest was the innovator company for the drug Lexapro, Ivax was the first Paragraph IV ANDA 
filer, and Caraco was the subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA filer.
422  Forest had two patent listings 
for its drug Lexapro in the Orange Book, to which Ivax and Caraco filed Paragraph IV 
certifications.  Forest sued Ivax on only one of these listed patents, which was found valid and 
infringed.
423  Forest sued Caraco on the litigated patent and provided Caraco a convenant not to 
sue on the unasserted patent.
424  Thereafter, Caraco brought a declaratory judgment action for the 
unasserted patent, because in order to trigger Ivax’s 180-day exclusivity, Caraco had to 
successfully challenge both of the listed patents in the Orange Book.  The Federal Circuit applied 
MedImmune’s all-the-circumstances test and found that, despite the covenant not to sue, 
                                                 
419 See Patel, supra note 19, at 1103.   
420 Id. at 1104.   
421 527 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2008).   
422 Id. at 1286, 1288.   
423 Id. at 1286.   
424 Id. at 1288.      
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Caraco’s declaratory judgment action presented a justiciable Article III controversy.  The 
controversy “exists because Forest’s actions effectively prevent the FDA from approving 
Caraco’s ANDA and thus exclude Caraco from the drug market.”
425   
However, in Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex, Inc.,
426 six months after 
deciding Caraco and in a case involving another covenant not to sue, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the dismissal of Apotex’s declaratory judgment action.  In Janssen, three patents were 
listed in the Orange Book related to Janssen’s listed drug, Risperdal Oral Solution.  Teva was the 
first Paragraph IV ANDA filer with regard to two of the patents and filed a Paragraph III 
certification to the third patent, the ‘663 patent.  Janssen did not bring infringement actions 
against Teva for the Paragraph IV certifications.  Apotex, the subsequent Paragraph IV filer, 
made Paragraph IV certifications to all three patents.  Janssen brought an infringement action 
only against the‘663 patent and granted a covenant not to sue with respect to the other two 
patents.
427  However, unlike in Caraco, Apotex “stipulated to the validity, infringement, and 
enforceability of the ‘663 patent.”
428  Applying the all-the-circumstances test, the Federal Circuit 
would have found Caraco controlling if Apotex had not made the stipulation.  Because of the 
stipulation, however, Apotex would not be able to obtain FDA approval until after the expiration 
of the ‘663 patent even if Apotex could prevail in its declaratory judgment action against the 
other two listed patents.  As such, the harm that created a justiciable controversy under Article III 
disappeared with the stipulation. 
                                                 
425 Id. at 1297.   
426 540 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
427 Id. at 1358.   
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Since Caraco and Janssen, district courts have evidenced difficulty applying the 
law with regard to declaratory judgment actions, demonstrating the Federal Circuit’s “lack of 
clear direction.”
429  For instance, in Dey, L.P. v. Sepracor,
430 the Delaware district court found 
that Dey’s declaratory judgment action presented a justiciable Article III controversy.  In the 
case, Sepracor listed six patents in the Orange Book regarding its brand-name drug Xopenex.  
Dey, the subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA filer, made Paragraph IV certifications to all six 
patents.  Sepracor sued Dey on only five of the patents.  Dey filed a declaratory judgment action 
regarding the unasserted patent, the ‘289 patent, and Sepracor granted Dey a covenant not to sue 
on this patent.  In analyzing whether the covenant not to sue eliminated Dey’s subject matter 
jurisdiction, the court reasoned that “the instant case is intermediate to Caraco and Janssen” and 
“is more like Caraco than Janssen.”
431  The court stated that “unlike Apotex in the Janssen case, 
Dey has not precluded itself from going to market prior to the primary ANDA filer.”
432  Thus, 
the court denied Sepracor’s motion and concluded that there was subject matter jurisdiction to 
hear the case.  
Recently, on October 6, 2010, the Federal Circuit held that there was subject 
matter jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment action in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. 
Eisai Co.
433  This case concerned Eisai’s brand-name drug Aricept, in which five patents were 
listed in the Orange Book for the drug.
434  Ranbaxy, the first Paragraph IV ANDA filer, made 
Paragraph IV certifications to four of the patents and a Paragraph III certification to the ‘841 
                                                 
429 Patel, supra note 19, at 1109 n. 222.   
430 595 F. Supp. 2d 355 (D. Del. 2009).   
431 Id. at 361 – 62.    
432 Id. at 362.   
433 620 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2010).   
434 Id. at 1343.    
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patent.
435  Ranbaxy’s 180-day exclusivity has yet to be triggered.  Teva, a subsequent Paragraph 
IV ANDA filer, submitted an amended ANDA with Paragraph IV certifications to all five 
patents, and Eisai only brought suit against Teva with respect to the ‘841 patent.  When Eisai did 
not initiate patent infringement litigation regarding the other four patents, Teva sought a 
declaratory judgment of non-infringement with respect to the four patents.
436  Prior to the 
declaratory judgment litigation, Eisai had filed statutory disclaimers with respect to two of the 
declaratory judgment patents.  After Teva’s filing of the declaratory judgment action, Eisai 
granted Teva covenants not to sue with respect to the other two declaratory judgment patents.  
Given the statutory disclaimers and covenants not sue, Eisai argued that Teva’s declaratory 
judgment action did not create a case or controversy under Article III.     
The court stated that the case “turn[ed] on whether a subsequent Paragraph IV 
filer has a legally cognizable interest in when the first-filer's exclusivity period begins, such that 
delay in triggering that period qualifies as “injury-in-fact” for the purposes of Article III.”
437  The 
court found that Teva’s action presented an actual controversy despite the statutory disclaimers 
and covenants not to sue, because the patents were still listed in the Orange Book.
438  Therefore, 
Teva still needed to obtain a court decision of patent invalidity or non-infringement to receive 
FDA approval.
439  The court found the case similar to Caraco: “as in Caraco, a favorable 
judgment ‘would eliminate the potential for the [DJ patents] to exclude [Teva] from the drug 
market.’”
440  The court held that it was important that the declaratory judgment patents were still 
                                                 
435 Id. at 1344. 
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438 Id. at 1348 n.3. 
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listed in the Orange Book, and that if Teva were to succeed in its declaratory judgment action 
with respect to the four patents, it would trigger Eisai’s 180-day exclusivity.   
These declaratory judgment actions, mostly arising in the context of a subsequent 
Paragraph IV ANDA filer trying to trigger the first applicant’s 180-day exclusivity, have been 
decided by the courts based on the specific factual circumstances of the cases under the 
MedImmune test.  The courts have relied on the Federal Circuit’s guidance in Caraco and 
Janssen, with the courts trying to determine if the case before them is more similar to Caraco or 
to Janssen.  Given that there are no bright-line rules in the courts’ declaratory judgment action 
jurisprudence, and that many different factual scenarios and nuances will likely develop, it will 
be hard to predict how the courts will rule in future cases.  More contentious litigation over 
whether subject matter jurisdiction exists in generic companies’ declaratory judgment actions 
will likely occur in the future, with the courts having a chance to further refine their 
jurisprudence.   
E.  Patent Settlement Agreements 
After the passage of the MMA and the promulgation of the 2003 FDA final rule 
clarifying patent listing requirements, much of the antitrust litigation against pharmaceutical 
companies has not stemmed from allegations of misrepresentation or fraud with regard to an 
NDA holder’s Orange Book patent listings.  However, concern over the anticompetitive effects 
of patent settlement agreements, which was an issue prior to the passage of the MMA,
441 still 
persists today.  The FTC Study of 2002 identified fourteen patent settlement agreements that had 
                                                 
441 For instance, during one of the Senate debates prior to the passage of the MMA, Senator 
Hatch stated, “The FTC is doing the right thing in taking enforcement actions against those who 
enter into anti-competitive agreements that violate our Nation’s antitrust laws.”  148 Cong. Rec. 
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the tendency to “park” a generic applicant’s 180-day exclusivity.
442  The parking of a generic 
company’s 180-day exclusivity delays the entry of generic competitors into the market, which 
then delays decreases in drug prices for consumers.
443   
Congress addressed the anticompetitive consequences of patent settlement 
agreements by passing two provisions in the MMA.  First, pursuant to the recommendation of 
the FTC, the MMA added a notification provision in which drug companies must file with the 
FTC and DOJ certain types of patent settlement agreements.
444  This requirement was added so 
that the FTC and DOJ could review certain patent settlement agreements for violations of the 
federal antitrust laws and take appropriate action if necessary.  Second, the MMA added 
forfeiture provisions to the Hatch-Waxman Act, whereby if a forfeiture event occurs, the first 
generic applicant loses its 180-day exclusivity.
 445  Some of these forfeiture events are tied 
explicitly to drug companies entering into patent settlement agreements.  For instance, under the 
failure to market forfeiture provision, the second component of the provision is satisfied if the 
generic company does not market the drug within seventy-five days after court approval of a 
settlement agreement that finds the patent to be invalid or not infringed.
446  Also, under a 
separate forfeiture provision of the MMA, a forfeiture event occurs if there is a final decision of 
the FTC or a court that finds a patent settlement agreement to be in violation of the antitrust 
laws.
447   
                                                 
442 See supra note 160 and accompanying text.   
443 See id.   
444 See supra notes 265-271 and accompanying text.   
445 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)-(ii).   
446 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I).   
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Although Congress attempted to address the concerns relating to reverse-payment 
patent settlement agreements through these MMA provisions, considerable debate exists over 
whether these provisions do an adequate job of remedying these agreements’ anticompetitive 
consequences.  Some commentators believe that Congress should ban reverse-payment 
settlement agreements or place more restrictions on them.  Other commentators believe that 
banning reverse-payment settlement agreements would lead to anticompetitive consequences.  
This next section analyzes the recent controversies over patent settlement agreements, an area of 
great debate among regulators, legislators, drug companies, consumers, courts, and scholars.   
1.  Scholarly Debate over Patent Settlement Agreements  
Since the 1990s, many Hatch-Waxman scholars, antitrust experts, and others have 
weighed in on the debate over reverse-payment patent settlement agreements.  On one side of the 
debate, many commentators believe that patent settlement agreements between generic and 
innovator companies or between two generic companies should not be banned.  For instance, 
Jonathan Lave argued that reverse-payment settlement agreements should not be deemed per se 
violations of the antitrust laws, because the “existence [of a reverse payment] does not 
necessarily show that the generic extracted monopoly rents from the pioneer or that the pioneer 
sought to protect an invalid patent.  Rather, the settlement’s terms may be procompetitive and 
rational.”
448  Lave concluded that the FTC and DOJ should adopt a case-by-case approach to 
reverse-payment settlements, reviewing the size of the payments in the settlements and 
upholding only reasonable payments that are less than or equal to a generic company’s expected 
payout from the litigation.
449   
                                                 
448 Jonathan M. Lave, Responding to Patent Litigation Settlements: Does the FTC Have it Right 
Yet?, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 201, 203 (2002).   
449 Id. at 226.    
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Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation on the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, stated his position on reverse-payment 
settlement agreements in dictum in a recent opinion.  He explained that “[a] ban on reverse-
payment settlements would reduce the incentive to challenge patents by reducing the 
challenger’s settlement options should he be sued for infringement, and so might well be thought 
anticompetitive.”
450  Echoing this sentiment was an opinion piece recently published in the Wall 
Street Journal that stated “[r]everse settlements expand the options for rationally ending patent 
disputes. . . . Eliminating reverse settlements will reduce the incentive to challenge patents at 
all.”
451 
On the other side of the debate, many commentators believe that there should be 
an outright ban on reverse-payment settlement agreements or a rebuttable presumption of their 
illegality.  For instance, Professor C. Scott Hemphill reasoned that “a settlement should be 
accorded a presumption of illegality as an unreasonable restraint of trade if the settlement both 
restricts the generic firm’s ability to market a competing drug and includes compensation from 
the innovator to the generic firm.”
452  This presumption can be rebutted by the drug companies 
making a showing that there are pro-competitive consequences of the settlement.
453  
Additionally, Professors Ponsoldt and Ehrenclou proposed a similar approach: reverse-payment 
settlement agreements that maintain the pioneer drug company’s monopoly should be 
presumptively illegal; this presumption can be rebutted by the pioneer drug company 
                                                 
450 Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (N.D. Ill. 2003).   
451 The ‘Pay for Delay’ Rap, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Oct. 5, 2010).   
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demonstrating that it was likely to win on the merits of the patent infringement litigation and that 
the settlement payment is similar to the expected litigation costs of the suit.
454      
2.  The FTC’s Position  
The FTC has long taken the position that reverse-payment settlement agreements 
are per se antitrust violations.
455  The FTC believes that these settlements – in which the 
innovator company pays the generic company and the generic company agrees to stay out of the 
market – delay generic competition and hurt consumers.  The Chairman of the FTC, Jon 
Leibowitz, has termed these agreements “win-win-lose” agreements: the pioneer company wins 
by continuing to have its monopoly, the generic company wins by being paid a large sum of 
money by the pioneer company, and the consumers lose by being forced to continue to pay high 
prices for drugs.
456   
The FTC has challenged many of these agreements as being unreasonable 
restraints on trade in violation of section 5 of the FTC Act.
457  In 2000 and 2001, the FTC 
succeeded in obtaining two consent decrees involving reverse-payment settlement agreements 
between innovator and generic drug companies.
458  Leibowitz declared that the FTC’s actions 
                                                 
454 James F. Ponsoldt & W. Hennen Ehrenclou, The Antitrust Legality of Pharmaceutical Patent 
Litigation Settlements, 2006 U. Ill. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 37, 57 – 58 (2006).   
455 See Hearing of the Senate Special Committee on Aging, 109th Cong. (July 20, 2006) 
(statement of Jon Leibowitz, Commissioner of the FTC) (“For the past decade, the FTC has 
made challenging patent settlements that delay generic entry a bipartisan priority.  In the late 
1990's, when we started seeing these disturbing pharmaceutical settlement payments, we acted to 
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456 See Official Says FTC Still Seeks to Bring Case on Reverse Payments to End Circuit Split, 
BNA PHARM. L. & INDUS. REP. (Oct. 8, 2010).   
457 See, e.g., In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. C-4076, 2003 WL 21008622 (F.T.C. Apr. 14, 
2003) (consent decree); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005).   
458 See In re Abbott Labs. & Geneva Pharm., Inc., No. C-3945, 2000 WL 681848 (F.T.C. May 
22, 2000); In re Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., No. 9293, 2001 WL 333643 (F.T.C. Apr. 2, 
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against companies entering into these types of agreements “stopped this conduct cold.  And it set 
forth rules that everyone understood: if you settle a pharmaceutical patent case by paying off a 
generic, you will face antitrust scrutiny.  As a result, to the best of our knowledge there were no 
such settlements between 2000 and 2004.”
459   
3.  Recent Litigation in the Courts 
Recently, however, the federal courts have not been very receptive to the FTC’s 
position on reverse-payment settlement agreements.  Currently, three circuit courts have held that 
reverse-payment settlement agreements are not per se antitrust violations.  The Eleventh Circuit 
in Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC,
460 the Second Circuit in In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust 
Litigation,
461 and the Federal Circuit in In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation
462 
all held that reverse-payment settlement agreements are legal so long as the agreements do not 
exceed the scope of patent protection.  However, the Sixth Circuit in In re Cardizem CD 
Antitrust Litigation
463 held that reverse-payment settlement agreements were per se illegal.  The 
circuit court stated: 
There is simply no escaping the conclusion that the Agreement, all of its other 
conditions and provisions notwithstanding, was, at its core, a horizontal 
agreement to eliminate competition in the market for Cardizem CD throughout 
the entire United States, a classic example of a per se illegal restraint of trade.
464 
 
Leibowitz stated that the court opinions upholding the reverse-payment settlement 
agreements “have dramatically altered the legal landscape,” hurting the FTC’s enforcement 
                                                 
459 Hearing of the Senate Special Committee on Aging, 109th Cong. (July 20, 2006) (statement of 
Jon Leibowitz, Commissioner of the FTC).   
460 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005).   
461 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006).   
462 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008).   
463 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).   
464 Id. at 908.    
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strategy.
465  Furthermore, the FTC has seen a rise in the number of reverse-payment settlement 
agreements being entered into by drug companies.
466  Given these federal courts’ positions on 
reverse-payment settlement agreements, the FTC and many commentators believe that the 
MMA’s addition of the notification provision was inadequate.  Even if drug companies must file 
reverse-payment settlement agreements with the DOJ and the FTC, and the FTC finds that these 
agreements violate the antitrust laws, the FTC has been unable to prevail on these antitrust 
claims in court.  One commentator stated that “Congress incorrectly assumed that the FTC would 
be able to stop pay-for-delay settlements.  This harmful practice has proceeded unabated in light 
of a split among the federal circuit courts of appeals on whether such payments are antitrust 
violations.”
467  In order to resolve the circuit split, the FTC has pursued the strategy of filing new 
suits in district courts to create a bigger split among the courts of appeals, so that the Supreme 
Court will be more likely to hear the issue.
468   
4.  The Failure to Market Provision and Patent Settlement Agreements 
In addition to the legal problems relating to the FTC’s recent enforcement efforts, 
commentators and FDA have acknowledged a loophole in the second component of the failure to 
market provision relating to patent settlement agreements.  The second component of the failure 
to market provision is satisfied if the generic company does not market the drug within seventy-
five days after court approval of a settlement agreement that finds the patent to be invalid or not 
                                                 
465 Hearing of the Senate Special Committee on Aging, 109th Cong. (July 20, 2006) (statement of 
Jon Leibowitz, Commissioner of the FTC).   
466 FTC, PAY FOR DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS 1 (Jan. 
2010), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/01/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf.   
467 Avery, supra note 3, at 190.   
468 See Official Says FTC Still Seeks to Bring Case on Reverse Payments to End Circuit Split, 
BNA PHARM. L. & INDUS. REP. (Oct. 8, 2010).      
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infringed.
469  Congress added this provision to prevent the parking of a generic company’s 180-
day exclusivity due to a patent settlement agreement.  Under the new provision, if a generic 
company eligible for 180-day exclusivity and an innovator company entered into a patent 
settlement agreement that found the patent to be invalid or not infringed, the generic company 
would forfeit its 180-day exclusivity if it did not market the drug within seventy-five days of 
court approval of the settlement.   
Several companies have circumvented this provision by entering into patent 
settlement agreements that do not include a finding of patent invalidity or non-infringement.  
Therefore, to the advantage of both the innovator company and the generic company, the generic 
company retains its 180-day exclusivity even after entering into the patent settlement agreement.  
In a 2008 decision letter, FDA acknowledged that “the structure of the 180-day exclusivity and 
forfeiture provisions may give rise to concerns about parking of exclusivity.”
470  FDA stated: 
Inherent in the structure of the "failure to market" forfeiture provisions is the 
possibility that a first applicant would be able to enter into a settlement agreement 
with the NDA holder or patent owner in which a court does not enter a final 
judgment of invalidity or non-infringement (i.e., without a forfeiture event under 
subpart (bb) occurring), and that subsequent applicants would be unable to initiate 
a forfeiture with a declaratory judgment action. This inability to force a forfeiture 
of 180-day exclusivity could result in delays in the approval of otherwise 
approvable ANDAs owned by applicants that would market their generic drugs if 
they could but obtain approval. This potential scenario is not one for which the 
statute currently provides a remedy.
471 
 
5.  Arkansas Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG 
In 2010, the Second Circuit had the opportunity to revisit the issue of the legality 
of reverse-payment settlement agreements in Arkansas Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund v. 
                                                 
469 See 21 U.S.C. § 505(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(BB).   
470 FDA, Letter to Marc A. Goshko, RE: Docket No. 2007N-0389, ANDA 77-165: Granisetron 
Hydrochloride Injection (Jan. 17, 2008), at 6.   
471 Id. at 5 n.6.    
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Bayer AG.
472  This case concerned Bayer AG’s brand-name drug Cipro, which is “the most 
prescribed antibiotic in the world.”
473  Barr Laboratories, Inc. filed an ANDA with a Paragraph 
IV certification to a patent of Cipro.  Bayer sued Barr for patent infringement, and two weeks 
before the start of the trial, Bayer and Barr entered into a reverse-payment settlement agreement.  
Bayer agreed to pay Barr approximately $398 million, and Barr agreed to concede to the validity 
of the patent and refrain from marketing a generic version of Cipro until the expiration of the 
patent.
474  In its analysis, the panel of the Second Circuit felt bound to apply the law as stated in 
the In re Tamoxifen case
475 and held that the reverse-payment settlement agreement did not 
violate the Sherman Act.
476  However, the court added several paragraphs at the end of its 
opinion that explained “why this case might be appropriate for reexamination by our full 
Court.”
477  First, the panel noted that the United States believes that the Tamoxifen standard does 
not contain the appropriate level of antitrust inquiry.  Second, the court stated that since the 
Second Circuit decided the Tamoxifen case, there has been an increase in the number of reverse-
payment settlement agreements.
478  Third, the court noted that after Tamoxifen was decided, 
Senator Hatch – a principal drafter of the Hatch-Waxman Act – stated, “I can tell you that I find 
these type[s] of reverse payment collusive agreements appalling.”
479  The court thus urged the 
plaintiffs to petition for a rehearing en banc. 
                                                 
472 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010). 
473 Id. at 100. 
474 Id. at 102.   
475 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006).   
476 Id. at 106.   
477 Id. at 108. 
478 Id. at 109. 
479 Id. (quoting 148 Cong. Rec. S7565 (July 30, 2002)).      
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The Second Circuit denied the plaintiffs’ petition for a rehearing en banc.  In 
dissent, Judge Pooler, a member of the original panel, expressed her discontent with patent 
settlement agreements, stating that “such settlements serve no obvious redeeming purpose.”
480  
Furthermore, she stated, “This type of settlement, once unheard of, has become increasingly 
common.  This Court has played a significant role in encouraging this unfortunate practice.”
481  
The plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on December 6, 2010.  Several prominent 
amici briefs were filed in support of the petition for writ of certiorari.  For instance, a group of 
thirty-two state attorneys general urged the Supreme Court to hear the case, arguing that these 
reverse-payment settlement agreements drive up drug prices for both the states’ citizens and the 
states themselves.
482  Additionally, a group of eighty law professors filed a brief urging the 
Supreme Court to take the case.  However, the Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of 
certiorari on March 7, 2011.
483 
The Supreme Court might not have granted the writ due to a lack of a circuit split, 
as three of the four courts of appeals to address the matter have held that reverse-payment 
settlement agreements are not per se illegal.  It appears likely that the FTC will continue to file 
suits in different district courts to try to create a circuit split for resolution by the Supreme Court.  
As one FTC employee stated, “As long as there are still circuits to bring cases in, we’re out there 
trying to do that.”
484  Or, the Supreme Court might not have taken the case given that the issue of 
                                                 
480 Ark. Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund, 625 F.3d 779, 780 (2d Cir. 2010).   
481 Id. at 780.   
482 Brief of the States of California, Arizona, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc. v. Bayer AG, No. 10-762, 2011 WL 96299.   
483 Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc. v. Bayer AG, 79 USLW 3370 (U.S. Mar. 07, 2011) (No. 
10-762).   
484 See Official Says FTC Still Seeks to Bring Case on Reverse Payments to End Circuit Split, 
BNA PHARM. L. & INDUS. REP. (Oct. 8, 2010).      
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reverse-payment settlement agreements “is [currently] a hot topic in the halls of Congress.”
485  
Given that the FTC, the United States, the federal courts, members of Congress, scholars, and 
drug companies have diverging views on the anticompetitive consequences of reverse-payment 
settlement agreements, a legislative or judicial resolution of the issue seems necessary.  The 
potential for legislative reform in this area will be discussed in Part VI. 
F.  Authorized Generic Drugs 
Both the 2003 MMA and FDA final rule failed to address the issue of authorized 
generic drugs (“authorized generics”) and the concern over these drugs’ anticompetitive 
consequences.  When an NDA holder’s pioneer drug is about to lose its market exclusivity and 
patent protections, the NDA holder may try to maintain some of its market share by competing 
with the new generic competitors that are about to enter the market.  The innovator drug 
company has two basic options in entering the generic drug market: either the innovator 
company itself (usually through a subsidiary) can manufacture, market, and sell a generic version 
of the pioneer drug under its own NDA, or the innovator company can license a generic drug 
company to market a generic version of the pioneer drug.  These types of generic drugs that enter 
the market are referred to as authorized generics.   
One commentator explains that “instead of being manufactured and marketed by a 
generic drug firm pursuant to FDA’s approval of an ANDA, authorized generics are 
                                                 
485 Kurt R. Karst, Psych! Second Circuit Denies Rehearing Petition in CIPRO Patent Settlement 
Litigation after Panel Invites Petition, FDA LAW BLOG (Sept. 9, 2010 12:20PM), 
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2010/09/psych-second-circuit-denies-
rehearing-petition-in-cipro-patent-settlement-litigation-after-panel-inv.html.      
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manufactured by, or under a licensing agreement with, the approved NDA holder for the brand-
name drug.”
486  FDA defines an authorized generic drug as the following:   
[T]he Agency defines the term . . . as any marketing by an NDA holder or 
authorized by an NDA holder, including through a third-party distributor, of the 
drug product approved under the NDA in a manner equivalent to the marketing 
practices of holders of an approved ANDA for that drug.  For example, an NDA 
holder might change the product’s label . . . or market the product through 
commercial channels routinely used by generics.
487 
 
Authorized generics are not listed in the Orange Book, but are identical to the substance 
of the pioneer drug.
488  Pursuant to the FDA Amendments Act of 2007 (“FDAA”), on 
July 28, 2009, FDA promulgated a final rule requiring that pioneer drug companies 
submit information to FDA on the sale of their authorized generics.
489 
A 2006 FDA study determined the effect of generic drug entry on pioneer drug 
prices.
490  When the first generic drug competitor enters the market, the pioneer drug price only 
decreases by about five percent.  However, when the sixth generic drug competitor enters the 
market, there is about a seventy-five percent decrease in the pioneer drug price.
491  So, when the 
NDA holder is about to lose patent protection of its pioneer drug, it makes economic sense for 
the NDA holder to enter the generic drug market as soon as possible, before the substantial 
decrease in drug prices with the entry of multiple generic drug competitors.   
                                                 
486 Jeffrey N. Wasserstein & Kurt R. Karst, New Law Reins in “Authorized Generics” Despite 
Generic Industry Court Losses, But Leaves Several Ambiguities, 11 REG. AFFAIRS FOCUS 8 
(2006), available at http://www.hpm.com/pdf/AUTHORIZED%20GENERICS_1.PDF.   
487 FDA, Letter to Stuart A. Williams (Mylan Pharmaceuticals) and James N. Czaban (Heller 
Ehrman), RE: Docket Nos. 2004P-0075/CP1 & 2004P-0261/CP1 (July 2, 2004), at 2 n.2, 
available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/DOCKETS/dailys/04/july04/070704/04p-0075-
pdn0001.pdf.   
488 Id. 
489 74 Fed. Reg. 37,163 (2009).   
490 See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text. 
491 Id.    
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The main debate over authorized generics arises when an authorized generic is 
marketed during a first generic applicant’s 180-day exclusivity.  Under the MMA, a first generic 
applicant that submits to FDA a substantially complete ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification 
to a patent of the pioneer drug is eligible for a period of 180 days of market exclusivity.
 492   
During this 180-day period, FDA is prohibited from approving any other ANDAs for the listed 
drug.
493  However, the MMA does not explicitly prohibit the marketing of a generic version of a 
pioneer drug under the pioneer drug company’s NDA.  One scholar notes that the market entry 
of an authorized generic during a first generic applicant’s 180-day exclusivity “substantially 
reduces the value of this period of market exclusivity.”
494  Many generic drug companies have 
petitioned FDA and sued in court to stop the marketing of authorized generics during the period 
of 180-day market exclusivity.  This next section explores the views of the federal courts, FTC, 
FDA, members of Congress, and Hatch-Waxman scholars on this new pressing issue of 
authorized generics. 
1.  The Position of FDA and the Courts  
In 2004, Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. and Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., both 
generic drug manufacturers, submitted citizen petitions to FDA, requesting that FDA prohibit the 
marketing and distribution of authorized generic drugs until after the companies’ respective 
periods of 180-day market exclusivity had expired.
495  The companies argued that, based on both 
the statutory provisions and policy of the Hatch-Waxman Act, FDA should delay the marketing 
of authorized generics until after a generic applicant’s valuable 180-day exclusivity period.  FDA 
                                                 
492 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).   
493 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).   
494 HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 16, at 767.   
495 See Citizen Petition of Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Docket No. 2004P-0074 (Feb. 18, 2004); 
Citizen Petition of Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., Docket No. 2004P-0261 (June 9, 2004).      
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denied both citizen petitions.  In its July 2, 2004 decision letter, FDA first stated that because an 
authorized generic is marketed under the FDA-approved NDA, simply at a lower price and under 
a different name, an authorized generic does not need FDA approval prior to being marketed.
496  
Then, FDA proceeded to reject the petitioners’ arguments based on both law and policy grounds.  
FDA stated that “[n]ot only does FDA lack authority to justify delaying the marketing of 
authorized generics solely to protect 180-day exclusivity, the Agency does not believe their 
marketing should be delayed in this manner, as this marketing appears to promote competition in 
the pharmaceutical marketplace.”
497   
FDA concluded that the entry of an authorized generic onto the market during a 
generic company’s 180-day exclusivity would increase competition and drive down prices of 
generic drugs for consumers, thus fulfilling one of the objectives of the Hatch-Waxman Act.
498  
FDA did not find any long-term anticompetitive consequences from allowing authorized 
generics onto the market during periods of 180-day exclusivity, as neither petitioner proffered 
evidence that “competition from authorized generics has the effect of destroying the intended 
benefit of the 180-day exclusivity and, thereby, the incentive to challenge patents.”
499  FDA 
concluded with the strong declaration that “[t]he marketing of authorized generics during the 
180-day exclusivity period is a long-standing, pro-competitive practice, permissible under the 
Act.”
500 
                                                 
496 FDA, Letter to Stuart A. Williams (Mylan Pharmaceuticals) and James N. Czaban (Heller 
Ehrman), supra note 487, at 2 (“Because removing the brand name or changing the channel of 
distribution is unlikely to pose any threats to public health, FDA has made clear that applicants 
generally need not submit any pre-approval notification to the Agency for these changes.”).   
497 Id. 
498 Id. at 12.   
499 Id. at 13.   
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Both Teva and Mylan filed complaints against FDA in federal district court, 
asking the courts to order that FDA prevent the marketing of authorized generics during the 
generic companies’ 180-day exclusivity.  The district courts affirmed FDA’s decisions.
501  The 
generic companies appealed, but both courts of appeals affirmed the district courts’ decisions.
502 
For instance, in Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd v. Crawford,
503 the D.C. Circuit upheld 
FDA’s ruling in its decision letter under Chevron step one.  The court concluded that the 180-day 
exclusivity provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act
504 does not prohibit an NDA holder from 
marketing an authorized generic during a generic company’s 180-day exclusivity period.
505 
2.  The Position of Generic Drug Companies and Other Scholars 
In its response to the Mylan and Teva citizen petitions, FDA clearly made known 
its position on authorized generics: (1) the Hatch-Waxman Act does not prohibit the marketing 
of authorized generics during a generic company’s 180-day exclusivity; and (2) the entry of 
authorized generic drugs increases competition, thus achieving one of the goals of the Hatch-
Waxman Act.  FDA’s first position regarding the mandate of the Hatch-Waxman Act has been 
upheld by the federal courts and is “undoubtedly correct.”
506   
However, much controversy remains regarding FDA’s second proposition that 
authorized generics have clear pro-competitive consequences by increasing competition in the 
generic drug market and thus driving down consumer prices.  While this short-term analysis may 
                                                 
501 See Teva Pharm. Indus. v. FDA, 355 F. Supp. 2d 111 (D.D.C. 2004); Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. 
FDA, Civ. No. 1:04cv174 (N.D. W. Va. Aug. 30, 2004).   
502 Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 454 F.3d 270 (4th Cir. 2006); Teva Pharm. Indus., Ltd. v. 
Crawford, 410 F.3d 51 (D.C. Cir. 2005).   
503 410 F.3d 51 (D.C. Cir. 2005).   
504 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).  
505 Teva, 410 F.3d at 55.   
506 See Avery, supra note 3, at 196.      
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be correct, generic drug companies and many scholars believe that the entry of authorized 
generics during generic companies’ periods of 180-day exclusivity may have great 
anticompetitive consequences in the long term.  The entry of an authorized generic during the 
180-day exclusivity period greatly cuts into the generic company’s profit during this period.  
Many scholars argue that this decreased profitability during the 180-day exclusivity period will 
lead to less generic ANDA applicants challenging patents through Paragraph IV certifications.  
One antitrust attorney reasoned that if generic companies are not certain that they can recoup 
their high patent litigation costs through the bounty of 180-day exclusivity, many generic 
companies will be less willing to challenge patents prior to expiration.
507  As a result, some 
scholars conclude that “in the long run, consumers will be harmed because an expectation of 
competition from authorized generics will significantly decrease the incentives of generic 
manufacturers to pursue entry prior to patent expiration.”
508 
One example of an authorized generic drug’s entry onto the market during a 
generic company’s 180-day exclusivity period is illustrative.   In 2003, FDA found that Apotex 
was eligible for 180-day exclusivity for its generic version of the anti-depressant drug Paxil.
509  
The pioneer drug company, GlaxoSmithKline, licensed Par Pharmaceutical to market an 
authorized generic of Paxil during Apotex’s 180-day exclusivity.  Apotex had estimated sales of 
$575 million during its period of 180-day market exclusivity; however, with the entry of the 
authorized generic, its actual sales were less than half of what it expected – only between $150 
                                                 
507 David A. Balto, We’ll Sell Generics Too: Innovator Drug Makers Are Gaming the Regulatory 
System and Harming Competition, 39 LEGAL TIMES 12 (Mar. 20, 2006). 
508 Bourke & Danberg, supra note 86, at 983.   
509 John R. Thomas, Authorized Generic Pharmaceuticals: Effects on Innovation, 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Jan. 29, 2010), at 8.     
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million and $200 million.
510  Apotex asserted in a filing to FDA “that the authorized generic 
crippled Apotex’s 180-day exclusivity.”
511   
There still exists much debate regarding the pro-competitive and anticompetitive 
consequences of authorized generic entry.  Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
America (“PhRMA”) hired IMS Consulting to conduct a study on authorized generics and in 
2006, IMS released a study that found that authorized generics benefit consumers.
512  Shortly 
thereafter, Generic Pharmaceutical Association (“GPha”) performed its own statistical analysis 
of the IMS study and found that the entry of authorized generics onto the market did not have the 
effect of lowering consumer prices and discouraged generic companies from challenging patents 
prior to expiration.
513 
3.  Legislative Action 
After generic companies like Teva and Mylan Pharmaceuticals lost their claims 
against authorized generics under the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic companies challenged the 
way authorized generics were considered under the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program.
514  Under 
the program, drug manufacturers must pay rebates to state Medicaid programs for “covered 
outpatient drugs.”  The rebate is calculated based on the difference between the drug’s Average 
Manufacturer Price (AMP) and the drug’s best price.
515  The statute treats authorized generics as 
                                                 
510 Id. 
511 Id.  
512 See IMS CONSULTING, REPORT TO PHRMA: ASSESSMENT OF AUTHORIZED GENERICS IN THE 
U.S. (2006); see also Bourke & Danberg, supra note 86, at 986 – 87.     
513 See Bourke & Danberg, supra note 86, at 987.     
514 See Medicaid Drug Rebate Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8; Wasserstein & Karst, supra note 
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pioneer drugs, as they are manufactured and sold under the innovator companies’ NDAs.
516  
However, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) “has historically acquiesced 
to the practice of drug manufacturers excluding authorized generics from the best price” of the 
pioneer drug.
517  Thus, by excluding authorized generics from the brand-name drug’s best price, 
innovator companies were able to pay lower rebates under the Medicaid program.  The Generic 
Pharmaceutical Association petitioned CMS to include the authorized generic price in an 
innovator drug’s best price for purposes of calculating the rebates.
518 
Congress resolved this issue when it enacted the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 
(“DRA”),
519 signed into law by President Bush on February 8, 2006.  The DRA amended the 
Medicaid Drug Rebate Statute to provide that the price of an authorized generic is now included 
in the calculation of a brand-name drug’s best price.  As a result of this revision, innovator 
companies that sell or license the marketing of authorized generics will have to pay higher 
rebates to state Medicaid programs.  One commentator explained that under the DRA, “generic 
manufacturers got much of what they were demanding,” and the DRA “will negatively affect the 
continued viability of authorized generic arrangements.”
520  Although this may constitute a 
success for generic companies against authorized generics in the Medicaid rebate context, the 
debate over authorized generic competition still persists in the Hatch-Waxman context.   
4.  The FTC Study  
Given the controversy over whether authorized generics have pro-competitive or 
anticompetitive consequences, and in response to several requests from concerned members of 
                                                 
516 See Medicaid Drug Rebate Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(k)(7)(A).   
517 See Wasserstein & Karst, supra note 486.   
518 Id. 
519 Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006).   
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Congress,
521 in April 2006 the FTC published a notice of its intent to conduct a study to examine 
both the short-term and long-term competitive effects of authorized generic drug entry.
522  The 
FTC released an Interim Report in June 2009.
523  The Interim Report only includes data and 
analysis of the short-term effects of authorized generic drug competition and does not assess the 
long-term effects of authorized generic drug entry.
524  With respect to the short-term effects, the 
FTC concluded that “our initial analysis suggests that consumers benefit and the healthcare 
system saves money during the 180-day exclusivity period when an [authorized generic] enters 
the market, due to the greater discounting that accompanies the added competition provided by 
the [authorized generic].”
525  The study also found that authorized generic entry during a generic 
company’s 180-day exclusivity cut the generic company’s profits by fifty percent.
526  The FTC 
will examine the long-term incentive effects on generic companies in its final report.
527  The 
debate over authorized generics still continues today, but the FTC’s issuance of the final report 
could lead to a legislative solution to the problem.   
                                                 
521 Senators Grassley, Leahy, and Rockefeller, and Representative Waxman asked the FTC to 
conduct a study on the competitive effects of authorized generic competition in the 
pharmaceutical marketplace. See FTC, AUTHORIZED GENERICS: AN INTERIM REPORT 1 (June 
2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/06/P062105authorizedgenericsreport.pdf.   
522 See FTC, Notice of Authorized Generic Drug Study, 71 Fed. Reg. 16,779 (Apr. 4, 2006); see 
also Hearing of the Senate Special Committee on Aging, 109th Cong. (July 20, 2006) (statement 
of Jon Leibowitz, Commissioner of the FTC) (“In the short run, the entry of an authorized 
generic may benefit consumers by creating additional competition that lowers prices.  Critics 
assert, however, that in the long term consumers will be harmed because competition from 
authorized generics – and the significantly lower profits that result – will decrease the incentives 
of generic firms to pursue entry, especially for non-blockbuster drugs.  At the Commission, we 
are undertaking a study to examine the competitive effects of authorized generics.”).     
523 FTC, AUTHORIZED GENERICS: AN INTERIM REPORT (June 2009), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/06/P062105authorizedgenericsreport.pdf.   
524 Id. at Executive Summary, 1.   
525 Id. at 2.  
526 Id. at Ch. 2, 1.   
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VI.  Avenues for Future Reform 
As illustrated in Part V of this paper, the MMA left unresolved several important 
issues under the Hatch-Waxman scheme and through the addition of new statutory provisions, 
the MMA also led to the unintended consequence of new Hatch-Waxman interpretive issues.  
Relying on the findings and analysis in Part V, this Part of the paper discusses several avenues of 
potential reform of the Hatch-Waxman scheme to settle these outstanding issues.  Particularly, 
this Part will briefly discuss possibilities of legislative reform in the areas of authorized generics, 
patent settlement agreements, the 180-day exclusivity provision, and the failure to market 
forfeiture provision.   
A.  Authorized Generics 
One Hatch-Waxman scholar noted that “[i]f authorized generics are to be 
prohibited or restricted, it is a change that Congress will likely have to make.”
528  This 
commentator is undeniably correct.  Under FDA’s interpretation, which was affirmed by the 
federal courts, the Hatch-Waxman Act does not prohibit the marketing of authorized generics 
during a generic company’s 180-day exclusivity.  Additionally, FDA has taken the position that 
authorized generics have pro-competitive consequences and that therefore NDA holders should 
be free to market these authorized generics for the benefit of consumers.  The federal courts have 
agreed with the FDA’s policy regarding authorized generics.  Therefore, if any reform of the way 
authorized generics are treated under the Hatch-Waxman Act occurs, it will be through 
Congress.  As illustrated by the passage of the DRA, which mandates that authorized generic 
prices be included in a brand-name drug’s best price for the purpose of calculating rebates under 
the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program, Congress has intervened in the area of authorized generics.  
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One commentator noted that with the enactment of the DRA, “generic manufacturers got much 
of what they were demanding” with respect to the treatment of authorized generics under the 
Medicaid Drug Rebate Program.  Thus, this may be a good indicator that generic drug 
manufacturers have the political clout to persuade Congress to pass a law revising how Hatch-
Waxman treats authorized generics, particularly regarding the issue of authorized generic 
competition during generic companies’ 180-day exclusivity period. 
The prospect of legislative reform with respect to authorized generics has already 
been initiated.  On February 16, 2011, Senator John Rockefeller introduced Senate bill S. 373, 
entitled the “Fair Prescription Drug Competition Act.”
529  On the same day, Representative Jo 
Ann Emerson introduced a similar bill – H.R. 741 – in the House.
530  Senator Rockefeller and 
Representative Emerson had introduced similar bills in the 110
th Congress, but no action was 
taken on the bills.
531  Both of the current bills would amend the Hatch-Waxman Act to add new 
section 21 U.S.C. § 355(w), entitled the “Prohibition of Authorized Generic Drugs.”
532  This 
provision would prohibit NDA holders, directly or indirectly, from marketing authorized 
generics from the time they receive notice of an ANDA applicant’s Paragraph IV certification to 
a patent of the listed drug until the expiration or forfeiture of the generic applicant’s 180-day 
                                                 
529 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, BILL SUMMARY & STATUS, 112TH CONGRESS (2011 – 2012), S. 373, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:S.373:.   
530 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, BILL SUMMARY & STATUS, 112TH CONGRESS (2011 – 2012), H.R. 
741, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:HR00741:.   
531 In 2007, Senator John Rockefeller introduced bill S. 438 and Representative Jo Ann Emerson 
introduced bill H.R. 806 that would prohibit the marketing of authorized generic drugs during a 
generic company’s 180-day exclusivity period.  See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, BILL SUMMARY & 
STATUS, 110TH CONGRESS (2007 – 2008), H.R. 806, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d110:HR00806:@@@D&summ2=m&.    
532 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, BILL TEXT, 112TH CONGRESS (2011 – 2012), S. 373, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c112:S.373:.      
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exclusivity.
533  Senator Rockefeller stated that “the 180-day exclusivity incentive to launch a 
patent challenge is being widely undermined by authorized generics,” and the passage of the bill 
would “revitalize and protect the true intent of the 180-day marketing exclusivity period created 
in the Hatch-Waxman Act.”
534  Furthermore, the Senator declared, “Our legislation eliminates 
one of the most prominent loopholes that brand name drug companies use to limit consumer 
access to lower-cost generic drugs.”
535  The loophole the Senator is referring to is the 180-day 
exclusivity provision, which only prevents FDA from approving other ANDAs during a generic 
company’s 180-day exclusivity period and not drugs marketed under the NDA for the listed 
drug.   
Until the FTC issues its final report, it is hard to determine the appropriateness of 
the proposed legislative reform.  In order to make an informed judgment, legislators need to have 
an understanding of both the short-term and long-term consequences of authorized generic 
competition.  As illustrated in Part IV, the FTC Report issued in 2002 regarding the thirty-month 
stay and 180-day exclusivity provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act had a profound influence on 
the drafters of the MMA.  The final FTC Report on authorized generics will probably have a 
similar effect – depending on the results, either urging legislators to pass the bill or persuading 
legislators to defeat the bill.   
                                                 
533 Id.   
534 See Kurt R. Karst, Legislation to Ban Authorized Generics During 180-Day Exclusivity 
Period Makes a Comeback in Congress, FDA LAW BLOG (Feb. 21, 2011 1:04 PM), 
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2011/02/legislation-to-ban-authorized-
generics-during-180-day-exclusivity-period-makes-a-comeback-in-congres.html.   
535 Bills Introduced in Senate, House Seek to Prohibit Authorized Generics, BNA PHARM. L. & 
INDUS. REP. (Fed. 25, 2011).      
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B.  Patent Settlement Agreements 
FTC Commissioner Jon Leibowitz stated in a 2006 congressional hearing, “From 
our perspective, we’ll continue to be vigilant in looking for ways to challenge anticompetitive 
settlements, and I hope the Supreme Court will eventually weigh in on this problem.  A 
legislative approach, however, could provide a swifter and more comprehensive solution.”
536  
Indeed, some members of Congress have been working on a legislative solution to the problem 
of reverse-payment settlement agreements in the past several years.  In June 2006, Senator Kohl 
introduced bill S. 3582, entitled the “Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act,” in the 
Senate.
537  This bill would have amended section 5 of the FTC Act so that it would be an unfair 
method of competition for any company to enter into a patent settlement agreement in which the 
ANDA filer received anything of value and the ANDA filer agreed not to research, manufacture, 
or sell the ANDA product for any period of time.
538  However, the bill was never acted upon in 
the Senate.   
In January 2010, the FTC issued a study on patent settlement agreements titled 
PAY FOR DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS.
539  In this study, 
the FTC found that reverse-payment settlement agreements significantly delayed generic 
competition – on average, for seventeen months longer than settlement agreements that did not 
                                                 
536 See Hearing of the Senate Special Committee on Aging, 109th Cong. (July 20, 2006) 
(statement of Jon Leibowitz, Commissioner of the FTC).   
537 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, BILL SUMMARY & STATUS, 109TH CONGRESS (2005 – 2006), S. 3582, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:s.03582:.   
538 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, BILL TEXT, 109TH CONGRESS (2005 – 2006), S. 3582, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:S.3582:.  
539 FTC, PAY FOR DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS (Jan. 
2010), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/01/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf.      
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include reverse payments.
540  The FTC then calculated that this delay in generic competition will 
cost American consumers approximately $3.5 billion a year in drug costs.
541  Due to these 
findings, the FTC recommended that Congress pass legislation, although the FTC did not 
recommend anything in particular about the substance of this legislation.  The FTC concluded 
that “a legislative solution offers the quickest and clearest way to deter these agreements and 
obtain the benefits of generic competition for consumers.”
542   
On January 25, 2011, Senator Kohl introduced bill S. 27 in the Senate.
543  The 
bill, amending the FTC Act, creates a presumption of illegality for any patent settlement 
agreement in which the ANDA filer receives anything of value and the ANDA filer agrees to 
limit or forgo research, development, manufacturing, or sales of the ANDA product for any 
period of time.
544  The presumption of illegality will be rebutted if the parties to the agreement 
“demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the procompetitive benefits of the agreement 
outweigh the anticompetitive effects of the agreement.”
545  The bill gives the FTC the authority 
to initiate a proceeding against the parties to such an agreement in order to enforce the bill’s 
provisions.  As one commentator noted, bill S. 27 would “effectively ban patent settlement 
agreements.”
546  President Obama supports this ban on reverse-payment settlement agreements, 
                                                 
540 Id. at 2.   
541 Id.  
542 Id. at 6.   
543 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, BILL SUMMARY & STATUS, 112TH CONGRESS (2010 – 2011), S. 27, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:s.00027:.   
544 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, BILL TEXT, 112TH CONGRESS (2010 – 2011), S. 27, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c112:1:./temp/~c112tNT1NP:e3580:.   
545 Id. 
546 Kurt R. Karst, Supreme Court Shuts Another Door on Patent Settlement Agreement Antitrust 
Challenge – Denies Certiorari in CIPRO Case, FDA LAW BLOG (Mar. 7, 2011 1:45PM), 
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2011/03/supreme-court-shuts-another-
door-on-patent-settlement-agreement-antitrust-challenge-denies-certiorat.html.      
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as the President’s Budget for FY 2012 “would give the [FTC] the authority to prohibit pay-for-
delay agreements in order to facilitate access to lower-cost generics,” which would lead to 
savings of $8.7 billion between 2012 and 2021.
547  Whether this support for a ban on reverse-
settlement payments will result in legislation is uncertain at this time.   
C.  180-Day Exclusivity Provision  
Many scholars believe that the 180-day exclusivity provision of the Hatch-
Waxman Act, even as reformed by the MMA, is flawed.  One commentator noted that “the 180-
day exclusivity period is not serving its purpose of eliminating weak patents.  True, it is 
encouraging lots of challenges to those patents.  But it is encouraging the challengers to accept 
compensation to drop those challenges, rather than taking them to judgment and benefiting the 
rest of the world.”
548  Senator Hatch noted the problems with the “first-to-file” regime prior to 
the passage of the MMA.  For instance, during a legislative hearing, he stated that he believed 
that the first-filer regime gave an unjustified advantage to the first Paragraph IV ANDA 
applicant.  Additionally, he believed that the first-filer regime provided the wrong incentives, as 
it encouraged generic applicants to challenge patents, whether or not their claims were 
meritorious.  Because of these concerns, Senator Hatch stated that “I am a proponent of what I 
call a successful challenger system. . . . [I]t appears to me that the 180-day marketing exclusivity 
provisions in the pending legislation contain perverse incentives that may result in unfortunate, if 
                                                 
547 Kurt R. Karst, The President’s FY 2012 Budget Would Create New User Fees, Ban Patent 
Settlements, and Reduce BPCIA Reference Product Exclusivity, FDA LAW BLOG (Feb. 15, 2011 
10:05 AM), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2011/02/the-presidents-fy-
2012-budget-would-create-new-user-fees-ban-patent-settlements-and-reduce-bpcia-ref.html.   
548 C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug Incentives and the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, ANTITRUST L.J. (forthcoming in 2011), at 2 – 3.        
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unintended, consequences.”
549  Before the passage of the MMA, FDA interpreted the 180-day 
exclusivity provision to have a “successful defense” requirement.  However, this interpretation 
was rejected by the D.C. Circuit
550 and subsequently not adopted by Congress, as Congress 
failed to include this requirement in the MMA. 
Recently, several scholars have advocated for reform similar to the “successful 
defense” requirement.  For instance, Professors C. Scott Hemphill and Mark Lemley offer an 
earned exclusivity proposal: “first-filing generic drug companies should be entitled to 180 days 
of exclusivity only if they successfully defeat the patent owner, for example by invalidating the 
patent or by proving that they did not infringe the patent.”
551  Thus, if the generic company loses 
the patent infringement case or enters into a settlement agreement with the innovator company, 
the generic company loses its 180-day exclusivity.  Though similar to FDA’s “successful 
defense” requirement, this proposal is broader in that if an innovator company does not sue the 
ANDA applicant for infringement, the generic company is still eligible for 180-day 
exclusivity.
552  This proposal could be implemented by amending the Hatch-Waxman Act.   
D.  Failure to Market Forfeiture Provision 
Many commentators have expressed a concern that the failure to market forfeiture 
provision currently does not achieve its intended goal of preventing the parking of 180-day 
exclusivity and increasing generic drug competition.  As explained in section V.E, FDA has 
recognized a loophole in the second prong of the failure to market forfeiture provision relating to 
                                                 
549 Examining the Senate and House Versions Hearing, supra note 216, at 2 – 3 (statement of 
Senator Orrin G. Hatch).   
550 Mova Pharmaceuticals, Corp. v. Shalala, 955 F. Supp. 128, 130 (D.D.C. 1997), aff’d 140 F.3d 
1060 (D.C. Cir. 1998).   
551 Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 548, at 3 – 4.  
552 Id. at 4.      
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patent settlement agreements.  Generic and innovator drug companies have evaded triggering the 
second date of the failure to market forfeiture provision by entering into an agreement that does 
not include a finding that the patent is invalid or not infringed.
553  Therefore, the generic 
company maintains its 180-day exclusivity and the generic and innovator companies benefit 
from the delayed entry of generic competition.  Given the statutory language of the failure to 
market provision, there does not appear to be an administrative fix, whereby FDA could interpret 
the statute so that it would cover patent settlement agreements that did not find the patent to be 
invalid or not infringed.  One commentator noted that “Congress clearly needs to return to this 
area to correct the flawed forfeiture provisions.”
554 
E.  Innovation  
All of the discussion and analysis regarding the post-MMA controversies in Part 
V and the areas of possible reform in Part VI have primarily dealt with the goal of increasing 
generic competition in the pharmaceutical market.  However, it is important not to lose sight of 
the other important goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act – encouraging innovation.  The MMA did 
not amend the patent term extension provisions of the original Hatch-Waxman Act to increase 
the length of patent term restoration.  During the legislative hearings and debates, an important 
theme that ran throughout the statements of various members of Congress, regulators, and others 
was that the balance struck between competition and innovation achieved by the original Hatch-
Waxman Act must be maintained.
555  However, one scholar stated that “their words in this regard 
                                                 
553 See Avery, supra note 3, at 200 (“[T]hese flawed provisions are easily avoided by drafting 
settlement agreements that contain no finding of patent invalidity or noninfringement.”).   
554 Id. 
555 For instance, during the June 2003 Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing, the Chief Counsel of 
FDA stated that the “main goal . . . in this area is to promote innovation, while also promoting 
rapid access to low-cost, safe and effective generic drugs.”  2003 Hearing, supra note 1, at 6 
(statement of Daniel E. Troy, Chief Counsel, FDA).  Additionally, during the Senate debate,    
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seemed to be spoken without any actual analysis of whether the reforms, together with other 
changes in the pharmaceutical industry, might dampen innovative incentives for innovative 
companies.”
556  The scholar predicted that, although the MMA’s reform of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act might lead to greater generic competition, the MMA “could depress the rate of 
pharmaceutical innovation.”
557 
In 2006, the Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) released a study entitled 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY.
558  The study reported that 
pharmaceutical companies’ spending on research and development (“R&D”) has increased 
threefold to sixfold over the past twenty-five years.  In 1984, pharmaceutical companies spent 
approximately $6 billion on R&D, and in 2004, pharmaceutical companies spent approximately 
$39 billion on R&D.
559  However, the study found that the “[c]ontinued growth in R&D 
spending has appeared to have little effect on the pace at which new drugs are developed. . . . As 
a result, the average R&D cost per new drug has grown significantly.”
560  The CBO study 
revealed the extraordinary cost and length of time it took to develop a new NCE drug.  The study 
stated that the time from development to marketing of a new NCE drug is about twelve years at a 
cost of about $800 million.
561 
                                                                                                                                                            
Senator Frist remarked, “The Hatch-Waxman law has almost 20 years of balance, and now is the 
time to go back and readjust and make sure that balance is well situated going forward.”  149 
Cong. Rec. S8197.   
556 Derzko, supra note 19, at 251.   
557 Id.  “[T]he continued downward pressure on the prices of innovative pharmaceuticals will 
lead to fewer resources for drug development, which may further dampen the pharmaceutical 
innovation drought that is already being experienced.”  Id. at 265.   
558 CBO, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY (Oct. 2006), 
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7615/10-02-DrugR-D.pdf.   
559 Id. at 7.   
560 Id. at 11.  
561 Id. at 20 – 21.      
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These findings of increasing R&D costs and decreasing production of innovative 
drugs indicate that “at some point, Congress must reconsider the compromise made in the 1984 
Act and find a new mechanism for assuring adequate market protection for NCE NDA drugs that 
will provide sufficient incentive for investment in research and development.”
562  One scholar 
recommended that one avenue might be to increase the length of patent protection or market 
exclusivity
563 so that the innovator companies could adequately earn back their R&D costs.
564  
Or, Congress could revise the original patent term extension provisions, increasing the length of 
the patent term extension.  Although this issue has not been extensively debated in Congress, it is 
an issue that must be considered in the future in order to maintain the original Hatch-Waxman 
balance.    
VII.  Conclusion 
On February 8, 2011, the Congressional Research Service (“CRS”) released a 
report entitled THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: A QUARTER CENTURY LATER.
565  The report 
concludes that the Hatch-Waxman Act has been a success.  At the time of the original Act’s 
passage in 1984, only approximately thirty-five percent of brand-name blockbuster drugs had 
generic counterparts, while today, virtually all brand-name blockbuster drugs have generic 
                                                 
562 HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 16, at 764.  
563 However, a recent study published in THE NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE found that 
several laws granting market exclusivity (such as the Orphan Drug Act), which aim to increase 
drug innovation, “have led to higher drug costs and misuse of exclusivity periods.”  Laws 
Granting Market Exclusivity Lead to Higher Drug Costs, Misuse, Analysis Says, BNA PHARM. L. 
& REP. (Nov. 12, 2010).   
564 See Derzko, supra note 19, at 253.   
565 WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: A QUARTER CENTURY 
LATER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (2011).      
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counterparts.  However, the report states that “concerns still remain whether or not the balance 
achieved by the Act remains appropriate 25 years later.”
566 
The background, discussion, and analysis of this paper are in line with the 
findings of the CRS report.  The Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 greatly increased generic 
competition, but at the same time, both innovator and generic competitors engaged in “gaming” 
several provisions of the Act for their own profit.  In 2003, FDA issued a final rule and Congress 
passed the MMA to close the loopholes that had become apparent in the years after the Hatch-
Waxman Act’s passage.  Although the final rule and statutory amendments definitively resolved 
the controversies regarding patent listing and thirty-month stays, the addition of new provisions 
to the Hatch-Waxman Act has led to unintended consequences and new controversies since 
2003.  For instance, much debate and controversy has surrounded the interpretation of the failure 
to market forfeiture provision and the patent delisting counterclaim provision, which have 
generated substantial litigation between innovator and generic drug companies.  Additionally, 
under the declaratory judgment action provision, courts are still grappling with what suffices as a 
controversy under Article III for generic companies’ declaratory judgment actions.  Further, two 
of the main issues being debated in Congress are the legality of reverse-payment settlement 
agreements and the legality of authorized generic competition.   
There are several possible legislative reforms pending relating to several of the 
controversies mentioned above, although it is hard to predict whether there will be enough 
political will to enact these reforms.  Moreover, it is difficult to predict whether these additional 
reforms, if enacted, will achieve their intended goals and maintain the ideal balance between 
innovation and competition.  It is important to note the 2003 statement of Daniel Troy, Chief 
                                                 
566 Id. The report specifically mentions the current issues of reverse-payment settlement 
agreements and authorized generics.  Id.    
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Counsel of FDA, regarding the inevitability of unintended consequences when amending the 
Hatch-Waxman Act: “But I am not smart enough, and the 20 people sitting around the room 
aren’t smart enough and far-sighted enough, despite all of our expertise and experience, to see 
every single situation that could be gamed.”
567  If Congress chooses to revise the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, there is no doubt that these provisions will be carefully thought out and drafted just as the 
MMA provisions were.  However, similar to the MMA provisions, it is likely that unintended 
consequences will result, leading to future controversy.  Given the complexity of the Hatch-
Waxman Act, the enormous sums of money involved in Hatch-Waxman issues, and the hiring of 
creative lawyers, Hatch-Waxman controversies are likely to extend well into the future.  
Regulators and policymakers face a daunting task in both maintaining the balance between 
innovation and competition struck by the original Hatch-Waxman Act and preventing the 
unintended consequences from legislative or administrative reform.   
                                                 
567 2003 Hearing, supra note 1, at 15 (statement of Daniel E. Troy, Chief Counsel, FDA).   